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ABSTRACT 
A Vancouver-based not-for-profit biomedical organization is facing a challenging 
mandate:  to create wealth and generate social benefits while becoming financially self-
sustaining by the end of its current five-year government mandate.  This analysis outlines 
the strategic alternatives available to the organization.  The external environment is 
assessed for five of the organization’s major programs.  The analysis then summarizes the 
internal resources and capabilities of the organization, with a focus on their position 
within the value creation process.  Current strategic intent and goals are reviewed, and the 
organization’s strategic alternatives are outlined and evaluated.  The external analysis, 
internal analysis and multi-goal assessment of the alternatives lead to proposal of a 
strategic plan for the organization.  Together, this analysis defines a unique position for 
the organization, and will help it achieve the desired impact on patient and social health 
and well-being. 
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1:  OVERVIEW:  THE PREVENTION OF ORGAN 
FAILURE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE IN CONTEXT 
1.1 The Need for Biomarkers 
Biomarkers are cellular, biochemical or molecular indicators of a process, event, 
condition or response that can be measured in tissues, cells or body fluids (Pharma 
Matters, 2008).  Physicians commonly use biomarkers as surrogate indicators for disease 
presence/progression; for example, blood cholesterol levels are a well-established 
biomarker of risk for developing coronary heart disease.  Most currently utilized clinical 
biomarkers are single genes or proteins (single analyte) or are a small panel of proteins 
found circulating in the blood (multi-analyte).  
The popular and scientific press heralded the publication of the human genome a 
decade ago as the advent of a new era of designing personalized therapeutics based on 
knowledge of an individual’s genetics.  It was thought that once scientists identified the 
particular genes, proteins or metabolites that were absent or dysfunctional in specific 
disease states, they could rationally design ways to correct this state.  However, while 
diseases arising from single-gene deficiencies do exist (e.g. cystic fibrosis), most diseases 
are complex and involve multiple genetic factors and environmental influences (e.g. 
diabetes and cardiovascular disease).  These diseases are therefore not easily “solved” by 
knowing an individual’s genetic makeup or their risk profile.    
Growing recognition of the complexity of disease has led to the use of new 
technologies to discover the molecular signatures associated with disease.  The study of 
the full set of genes, proteins or metabolites associated with a particular disease is called 
genomics, proteomics, or metabolomics respectively.  Such “discovery” studies are 
  2 
completed using high performance technology platforms that generate a list of hundreds 
of analytes that are differentially regulated between normal and disease states.  Scientists 
then validate, refine, and develop these genomic, proteomic, or metabolomic signatures 
to generate tests for improved diagnostic, predictive, or prognostic patient care.   
The Oncotype Dx test, developed by Genomic Health, provides a useful example 
of the utility of “omics” technology in discovering and developing new disease 
biomarkers.  Oncotype Dx analyzes a panel of genes within a breast tumour tissue sample 
to determine the likelihood of tumour recurrence (Paik et al., 2004). Of the 25,000 genes 
present in the human genome, Genomic Health identified 250 candidate genes linked 
with breast cancer recurrence.  Of this panel, Genomic Health identified 16 genes that 
had expression levels that strongly correlated with breast tumour recurrence.  These 16 
genes, along with five stably-expressed control genes, were validated and developed into 
the Oncotype Dx test, which gives a readout of a patient’s risk of tumour reoccurrence.  
Clinicians use this biomarker information to determine the appropriate regimen and 
intensity of chemotherapy treatment for a particular breast cancer patient.  Similar 
biomarker-based tests have been or are being developed not only in oncology, but also in 
other complex disease areas.  
1.2 The Development Pathway for New Biomarkers 
Development of new, clinically useful biomarker-based tests (molecular tests) 
begins with a clearly defined clinical problem for which a set of biomarkers could 
improve patient management.  The first phase in biomarker development is a biomarker 
discovery study.  In this phase, clinical staff collects samples (tissue, blood, or urine) 
from a relatively small group of patients, and research staff performs biomarker 
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discovery.  Scientists analyze and validate candidate biomarkers in a small population 
and then in a large, multi-centre clinical trial.  Biomarker developers must also design 
clinical assays using platform technologies that are reliable, easy-to-use, rapid, and cost-
effective, all within the desired targets for sensitivity and specificity.  Commercialization 
and implementation of a new molecular test requires significant capital, acceptance by 
regulatory authorities and payers, and ultimately, adoption of the technology by 
physicians and clinical laboratories.  Thus, the process of successfully bringing new 
biomarkers to the clinic is long, complex, and requires expertise in a broad range of areas.  
1.3 History of the PROOF Centre of Excellence 
1.3.1 The Networks of Centres of Excellence  
The Networks of Centres of Excellence (NCE) program was initiated by the 
Government of Canada in 1989 as a joint initiative shared amongst Industry Canada and 
the three major Canadian Granting Councils:   the Natural Sciences and Engineering 
Research Council of Canada (NSERC), the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC), and the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR).  
The government intended the NCE to facilitate knowledge exchange and multi-sectoral 
collaboration amongst Canadian researchers through virtual networks.  The program goal 
was to nurture the scientific talent necessary to ensure global Canadian competitiveness 
and productivity.  By 2004, the NCE had funded 21 networks, involving more than 7000 
people at 1300 Canadian organizations and almost 350 international organizations 
(Networks of Centres of Excellence of Canada, 2004).  
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1.3.2 The Centres of Excellence in Commercialization and Research (CECR) 
Program 
In 2006, the Canadian government released a long-term economic strategy 
outlining plans to strengthen Canada’s economy (Department of Finance, 2006).  This 
plan acknowledged that despite Canada’s strong research base, lagging innovation and 
productivity threatened Canada’s economic competitiveness.  To help promote 
innovation and increase productivity, the Canadian government committed more than 
$350 million to create three new NCE-led programs:  the CECR Program, the Business-
Led NCE Program and an Industrial Research and Development Internship Program. 
The goals of the CECR program are to increase private sector R&D investment, 
support the training of skilled researchers, and connect the resulting ideas and talent to 
Canadian businesses.  To achieve this goal, the CECR Program funded centres focused 
on translation and commercialization of research.  Centres focus on one of the four 
priority areas identified by the federal government as critical to Canadian 
competitiveness:  environmental science/technology, natural resources and energy, life 
sciences, and information technology (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 2009).  The NCE 
defined the anticipated benefits arising from the CECRs as increased Canadian economic 
activity and quality of life.  Finally, the NCE mandated that CECR-funded centres 
become financially self-sustaining by the end of their funding period.  
The NCE held the first CECR funding competition in 2008, and attracted 110 
eligible letters of intent.  Twenty-five applicants invited to submit full applications, and 
the NCE funded eleven of these. Another six Centres received CECR funding in the 2009 
competition (Ekos Research Associates Inc., 2009).   
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1.3.3 The Increasing Socioeconomic Burden of Organ Failure 
Heart, lung, and kidney diseases are amongst are complex, poorly understood, and 
involve both genetic and environmental influences.  Physical inactivity, tobacco use, and 
changing dietary habits have contributed to increasing obesity, hypertension, diabetes, 
and dyslipidemia that in turn are driving epidemic organ failure.  Indeed, one in four 
Canadians is at risk for organ failure.  This disease burden places significant pressure on 
already tight health care budgets.   
Current approaches to predicting, diagnosing and monitoring organ failure do not 
allow for early intervention or prevention of irreversible organ damage.  Clinicians 
typically use a “one-size fits all” approach, treating patients with the same regimen of 
medications and follow-ups.  For example, chronic kidney disease (CKD) patients have 
multiple disease outcomes:  stable, non-progressive disease; progressive disease that 
leads to fatal cardiovascular complications; or rapidly progressive disease requiring 
kidney replacement via dialysis or transplantation (Levin, Djurdjev, Beaulieu, & Er, 
2008).  In the absence of a way to identify which type of CKD an individual patient has, 
clinicians treat and monitor each individual identically.  This means that patients with 
stable disease are likely over-medicated and over-monitored, at great cost both to the 
individual and to health care budgets.  On the other hand, patients with rapidly 
progressing disease might benefit from more intensive treatment and follow-up than they 
would otherwise receive. 
1.3.4 The Need for Biomarkers of Organ Failure  
Intervention in organ failure typically occurs only after significant and often 
irreversible damage has occurred.  This greatly increases the costs associated with 
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managing disease, and results in poorer outcomes for patients.  Moreover, current 
methods (e.g. tissue biopsy) are often invasive and uncomfortable for patients, and in 
some cases are themselves associated with adverse consequences (Evans et al., 2005).  
Thus, there is a clear need for biomarkers to help guide earlier, more effective 
interventions when disease processes are still modifiable.  Prognostic biomarkers could 
guide tailored disease intervention efforts and prevent unnecessary and potentially 
harmful treatment.  Finally, it is estimated that upwards of 50% of medicines dispensed to 
patients are ineffective or even harmful (Aspinall & Hamermesh, 2007).  Biomarkers of 
response to treatment could reduce ineffective drug use by identifying patients unlikely to 
respond or likely to have an adverse reaction to a particular drug.   
In addition to the use of biomarkers in patient care, pharmaceutical companies 
desperately need new biomarkers of organ function and fate for drug development.  
Despite the large patient populations affected by heart, lung, and kidney failure, relatively 
few effective treatments exist for these diseases.  In this setting, biomarker panels could 
help identify drug-associated toxicities, which would allow drug companies to shelve ill-
fated drug candidates earlier and redirect resources elsewhere.  Drug companies could 
also use biomarkers to identify which patients are most likely to respond to treatment. 
This would reduce the size of clinical trials required to demonstrate drug safety and 
efficacy to regulatory authorities, and therefore decrease overall drug development costs.  
Firms could also use biomarkers as surrogate markers of disease state, providing an 
indicator by which the efficacy of new drug candidates could be judged.  In all of these 
scenarios, biomarkers would hasten drug development efforts for organ failure.    
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1.3.4.1 Organ Transplantation in Canada 
Each year in Canada, more than 1350 adults reach end-stage heart, kidney, or lung 
failure and undergo organ transplantation to replace this lost organ function.  Many others 
die of disease complications or while awaiting a transplant (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information, 2010).  In order to prevent the recipient’s immune system from rejecting the 
transplanted organ, physicians treat transplant patients with a lifelong regimen of 
immunosuppressive drugs.  However, these drugs are themselves toxic to the transplanted 
tissues, so ideally physicians prescribe the minimal effective dose for each patient.  A 
second challenge associated with the management of transplant recipients is that it is 
difficult for physicians to know whether the transplanted organ is undergoing rejection.  
Surrogate clinical measurements of organ function (e.g. circulating creatinine levels for 
kidney transplant patients) are commonly used, but rarely differentiate between organ 
rejection and more general organ dysfunction.  Thus, the most common means of 
diagnosing organ rejection is via tissue biopsy, in which a small tissue sample from the 
transplanted organ is analysed for signs of immune infiltration.  However, organ rejection 
is often evident in biopsy samples only after irreversible organ damage has occurred, and 
biopsy analysis is subject to the interpretation of the pathologist viewing the sample.  
Moreover, tissue biopsies are costly (~$4000 for heart transplant patients), can cause 
(rare) complications, and are painful and uncomfortable for the patients (Evans, Williams 
et al. 2005).  There is therefore a significant need for more effective, minimally invasive 
ways of diagnosing organ rejection in transplant patients.   
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1.3.4.2 The Biomarkers in Transplantation (BiT) Project 
The Biomarkers in Transplantation (BiT) project was designed to address the 
unmet need for better predictive and diagnostic tests for acute and chronic immune 
rejection in heart and kidney transplantation.  In 2004, Drs. Bruce McManus, Paul 
Keown, and Rob McMaster assembled a team to collect blood and tissue biopsy samples, 
along with clinical data and transplant outcomes, from cohorts of heart or kidney 
transplant recipients.  Biological samples were mined using genomic and proteomic tools 
in order to identify a blood-based biosignature of organ rejection.  As one example, the 
team identified 24 circulating markers that are indicative of early rejection of transplanted 
kidneys (Gunther et al., 2009).  The team intends to combine these markers into a single 
test that can be administered using a simple blood draw taken from patients.   
The first phase of the BiT program, in which more than 700 transplant patients 
were recruited for biomarker discovery, was funded by Genome Canada, Novartis, IBM, 
and other partners.  The next step was to refine the biomarker panels identified in Phase I 
of the study, and to test them in a larger, more diverse group of patients.  However, in 
order to complete this second phase of development, the BiT team required significant 
additional funding.       
1.3.5 Launch of the PROOF Centre  
  In 2008, Dr. Bruce McManus of the Providence Heart + Lung Institute at St. 
Paul’s Hospital led a successful application for a new CECR called the PROOF Centre.  
The NCE contributed nearly $15M of federal funding, and mandated that a minimum of 
$10M in cash and/or in-kind funds must be sought from other partners.  The PROOF 
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Centre solicited and successfully attracted these matching funds from multiple industrial, 
academic, and not-for-profit partners.   
The PROOF Centre brought the BiT program into the organization as its lead 
program.  In addition to BiT, PROOF currently has three other disease-focused biomarker 
programs (in chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, chronic heart failure, and chronic 
kidney disease) and an assay development program focusing on multiple reaction 
monitoring assays for measuring protein fragments. 
1.3.6 PROOF Centre Organizational Structure 
The PROOF Centre is incorporated as a not-for-profit society in British Columbia 
and is governed by a Board of Directors.  The PROOF Centre Core Management Team 
consists of the Director and Chief Development, Scientific, Information, and Operating 
Offices.  The Director of the Centre, Dr. Bruce McManus, reports to the Board and 
provides leadership and direction for the organization.  The Chief Development Officer 
(CDO) leads business development and commercialization activities.  The Chief 
Scientific Officer (CSO) oversees technology development and scientific activities.  The 
Chief Informatics Officer (CIO) directs information technology activities and leads the 
organization’s computational team.  The Chief Operating Officer (COO) develops, 
administers and operationalizes procedures and policies for the PROOF Centre, including 
financial and human resource management and project/program management.   
In addition to this core team, PROOF management includes Medical Officers 
representing heart, lung, and kidney diseases, a Clinical Laboratory Applications Officer, 
a Statistical Officer, and several Scientific Liaisons.  These individuals advise PROOF 
management on their respective areas of expertise.  PROOF has also convened a 
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Translation Advisory Committee (TAC), which meets twice annually to review 
biomarker development programs.  This group reports to and advises PROOF 
management and Directors on how to best position PROOF’s programs for 
commercialization and implementation.  In all, the organization is comprised of roughly 
thirty personnel, with many more clinical and academic affiliates.   
1.3.7 The PROOF Centre Business Model 
The PROOF Centre model begins with identification of a clear clinical area in 
which a set of biomarkers could enhance patient care.  In order to define these areas, 
PROOF consults partners in academia, healthcare, health policy, industry, and 
government.  PROOF facilitates biomarker discovery and development activities using its 
own strategic resources (including access to patient populations, and computational, 
scientific, and clinical expertise), and in collaboration with its partners (which provide 
technology platforms, industry access, and expertise in intellectual property management, 
regulatory approval, commercialization, and implementation in health systems).  
PROOF’s goal is to serve as a “one-stop-shop” for biomarker discovery, development, 
commercialization and implementation.  The organization itself does not seek to market 
new molecular tests.  Rather, it is pursuing a range of business development activities 
aimed at commercializing the intellectual property arising from each of its biomarker 
development programs.  This may include out-licensing, technology co-development, 
companion diagnostics, biomarker trials, and/or forming spin-off companies. 
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1.4 Summary 
As a not-for-profit entity operating with federal funds, PROOF bears a 
challenging mandate:  to creation wealth, provide social benefits, and become self-
sustaining by the end of its funding period.  It has garnered a total of $10.8 million in 
cash and in-kind funding from a variety of sources, and continues to supplement its 
budget through grant funding mechanisms.  There is a significant market for new medical 
tests; indeed, diagnostics drive 60-70% of clinical decision-making in hospitals 
(Batchelder & Miller, 2006).  However, the average new molecular test requires 5 years 
and $45 million for development and regulatory approval (Davis et al., 2009).  PROOF’s 
short timeline for results presents a significant obstacle to—and may be fundamentally 
incompatible with—its near-term commercialization mandate.  While the NCE may 
extend the lifetime of (some of) the CECRs, this currently remains unknown.   
As a result of these realities, PROOF is considering several strategies for bringing 
its intellectual property to market and becoming self-sustaining.  These include joint 
development with one or more external industry partners, outlicensing or outright sale of 
intellectual property to industrial recipients, and/or in-house development through 
formation of a spin-out company.  The organization has not systematically assessed 
which of these possible avenues for commercialization and implementation would be 
most advantageous for each of its programs.   
PROOF has developed significant expertise in the computational analysis of 
biomarker discovery data in order to identify and validate the most promising biomarker 
candidates.  The organization believes there is an external market for these services, 
which it perceives to be highly specialized and not widely available.  PROOF is thus 
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considering offering computational services to other organizations on a contract, fee-for-
service basis.     
1.5 Aim and Scope of the Analysis 
The aim of this analysis is to define PROOF’s current strategy and to evaluate the 
sustainability of this strategy given the competitive environment and PROOF’s internal 
resources and capabilities.  Chapter 2 analyzes the structure and features defining the 
industries in which PROOF’s competes.  Chapter 3 assesses the internal resources and 
capabilities of the organization, with a focus on the value creation process for new 
molecular tests.  PROOF’s current strategy, and the likely outcomes arising from this 
strategy, are then reviewed.  Finally, the organization’s strategic alternatives are outlined 
and analyzed.  Together, this analysis defines a unique position for PROOF.  It is 
anticipated that the analysis will help PROOF management better discern the 
organization’s value proposition and the unique network of activities that support this 
position.     
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2:  VALUE CREATION IN THE MOLECULAR TESTS 
META-INDUSTRY 
2.1 PROOF’s Core Businesses—Biomarkers and Assay Technologies 
In order to understand PROOF’s position within the marketplace, it is useful to 
assess the industries in which the organization operates.  Broadly speaking, PROOF 
operates within the human health products sector—that is, the sector encompassing all 
regulated and unregulated products intended to promote, maintain, or restore human 
health.  This is a very broad sector, including medical devices, pharmaceuticals, 
nutritional and natural health products, diagnostic tests and many other industries, some 
of which are not relevant to PROOF.  PROOF is involved in several related but unique 
lines of business, so the organization actually operates in several interdependent 
industries.  Figure 2-1 maps out the key activities in and connections between these 
industries, to which subsequent analysis will be limited.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  14 
Figure 2-1:  Key Activities in and Connections Between Relevant Industries within 
the Human Health Products Sector 
 
Source:  by author 
PROOF’s core business is in the discovery and validation of panels of biomarkers 
of heart, lung and kidney health and disease (Figure 2-1; shown in orange).  The 
organization has four major biomarker discovery and development programs, as well as 
several smaller programs.  Because biomarker panels discovered through these programs 
have several potential uses, PROOF has multiple routes to commercialization.  First, 
PROOF could develop its biomarker panels into molecular tests.  Molecular tests 
quantify the relative levels of biomolecules (DNA, RNA, protein, and/or metabolites) in 
order to diagnose organ failure, predict organ disease risk, or predict response to therapy.  
PROOF could design its molecular tests for research (Figure 2-1; shown in purple) or for 
clinical use (Figure 2-1; green).  Physicians would ultimately use these biomarker-based 
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tests to predict, diagnose, classify and monitor disease, and/or to predict and monitor 
response to therapy (see Figure 2-2 left panel). 
Figure 2-2:  Potential Uses for Biomarkers in Clinical Care and in Drug 
Development  
 
Source:  Adapted from Institute of Medicine, 2010 
Biomarkers are an essential input not only for the development of new diagnostics 
for clinical care, but also for drug development (Figure 2-1; shown in blue).  Drug 
developers need biomarkers to develop new assays related to disease state, to repurpose 
existing drugs for another indication, and/or to identify new targets for drug development 
(see Figure 2-2; right panel).  Pharmaceutical firms use drug development biomarkers as 
internal decision-making tools rather than in the clinic.  The discovery and validation 
phases of development required for biomarkers for drug development and research are 
identical to those for clinical biomarkers. However, biomarkers intended for clinical 
usage require much more extensive and rigorous qualification and regulatory approval.      
In addition to biomarker-based programs, PROOF has a program focused on 
developing novel assay technologies (Figure 2-1; shown in grey), which are a second 
Biomarkers for Research/Clinical 
Use
• risk stratification
• prevention
• screening
• diagnosis
• disease classification
• prognosis
• prediction/treatment stratification
• therapy-related risk management
• therapy  monitoring
• disease/complication surveillance
Biomarkers for Drug Development
• target validation
• early screening for compound 
safety/efficacy
• pharmacokinetics:  drug activity, 
dosing and schedulings tudies
• patient inclusion/exclusion in 
clinical trials
• surrogate disease/drug efficacy 
endpoints
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essential component of new molecular tests.  Ultimately, the aim is to develop and 
validate these technologies as a platform for quantifying biomarkers in research and/or 
clinical settings.   
2.2 Structure of the Molecular Tests Marketplace 
PROOF anticipates that most of its programs will yield new molecular tests (MT).  
Thus, it is helpful to review the structure of the molecular tests meta-industry.  Public and 
university research labs, biomarker discovery companies, diagnostic developers, and 
pharmaceutical companies may all seek to earn rents from at least one stage of the value 
chain linking biomarker discovery to molecular test commercialization (see Figure 2-3).   
Figure 2-3:  Positioning of Organizations along the Value Chain for New Molecular 
Tests (MTs).  Darker colour indicates area of focus. 
 
Source:  by author 
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Research institutions, biomarker discovery firms, and smaller diagnostics companies are 
all involved in biomarker discovery.  However, these firms and institutions typically lack 
end-to-end capacity for development and commercialization activities. On the other hand, 
large diagnostic companies have historical strength in the market for laboratory and 
research use only tests, but only recently have sought to expand into the market for 
clinical tests.  Pharmaceutical companies have strengths in marketing, distribution, 
regulatory affairs, and reimbursement, but in general lack diagnostic-related capacity 
(Rosen, 2009).  Thus, there is significant opportunity for acquisitions, collaborations, and 
strategic alliances in the molecular tests meta-industry.  However, many pharmaceutical 
firms have begun to build capacity for diagnostics development in order to move 
backwards in and capture more value from new molecular tests (see Figure 2-3).  As one 
example, Roche has indicated that a key priority for the firm is molecular tests (F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, 2010).    
Molecular testing platforms are essential complementary assets for molecular 
tests.  However, first generation, multiplex-compatible platforms are large, expensive, 
and require specialized training to utilize.  It is therefore unsurprising that in the U.S., 
perhaps only 10% of hospital-based clinical labs routinely run molecular tests, and that 
most molecular tests are run in reference labs or in large clinical centres only (Rosen, 
2009).  Most market leaders in molecular testing platforms—including Luminex, Roche 
Diagnostics, and Illumina—are therefore developing second-generation platform 
technologies that are more user-friendly, smaller, cheaper, and yet still have high-
throughput multiplex capabilities.   
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2.3 Overview of External Analysis 
A useful way to summarize the current state and prospects of an industry in terms 
of long-term profit potential is by assessing the relative strength of five key competitive 
forces—intra-firm rivalry, power of suppliers, power of buyers, threat of new entrants, 
and threat of product substitutes (Porter, 1979).  Industry analysis is imperative for not-
for-profit organizations such as PROOF as a way of understanding the external influences 
impacting the organization.       
PROOF is pursuing two lines of business: biomarker discovery and development, 
and novel assay technologies.  As reviewed above (see Figure 2-1), biomarkers and assay 
technologies provide the building blocks for several related industries, including 
molecular tests for research, molecular tests for clinical use, assay platforms, and drug 
development.  Each of PROOF’s individual programs targets one or more of these 
industries, and each faces a distinct competitive environment.  Thus, in order to 
understand the overall competitive position of the organization, subsequent sections will 
analyze five of PROOF’s major programs individually in the context of their respective 
external industry environments.          
2.4 Biomarkers of Heart and Kidney Transplantation 
2.4.1 Overview of PROOF’s Biomarkers in Transplantation Program 
The objective of the BiT program is to discover, validate, and develop blood-
based proteomic and genomic biomarkers to address the need for better diagnosis and 
prognosis of transplanted heart and kidney rejection.  In Phase I, BiT investigators 
identified biomarker panels for the diagnosis of acute and chronic rejection.  The goal of 
Phase II (BiT2) is to validate these biomarker panels in a larger group of transplant 
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patients, and to bring these biomarker panels to market in order to guide biopsy and 
treatment decisions.  Phase II will include:  prospective enrolment of and sample 
collection from transplant patients at multiple international clinical sites; biomarker panel 
refinement and panel selection via computational strategies; translation of biomarker 
panels from discovery platforms to clinically relevant platforms; regulatory review and 
approval; and commercialization and implementation.   
PROOF’s BiT program is operating in the molecular tests for heart and kidney 
transplant management industry.  Transplantation is a last resort treatment option for 
patients with end-stage heart or kidney failure.  It is relatively infrequent owing to lack of 
organ availability and the expense associated with organ transplantation and post-
transplant management.  Ultimately PROOF intends to develop up to four distinct tests 
each for heart and kidney transplant management (eight tests in total) to address unmet 
needs in organ transplant management.  This includes tests to predict acute or chronic 
organ rejection, and tests to diagnose acute or chronic organ rejection.  
This industry is new and remains in the embryonic stages.  Regulatory processes 
guiding acceptance of new products remain unclear.  With a limited market size, there are 
few industry participants.  Most participants are in the research or very early 
commercialization phases; indeed, only one product has received marketing approval 
from the US FDA.  Therefore, the industry as a whole has a high concentration ratio, and 
is characterized by negative cash flows and unprofitability resulting from resource-
intensive new product development.   
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2.4.2 Competition is Low in this Market 
While the prevalence of heart and kidney disease is growing rapidly worldwide, 
relatively few patients undergo organ transplantation for end-stage organ failure.  In 
2006, surgeons performed roughly 2,100 heart transplants and 17,000 kidney transplants 
in the United States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008).  Due to 
limited organ availability, organ transplantation rates will likely remain static in the 
future.  Indeed transplantation may decrease as public policy and industry increasingly 
focus on preventing and delaying progression of organ disease.  Thus, rivals that are 
developing new molecular tests will have to compete to gain market share amongst the 
physicians managing this limited number of patients.   
On the other hand, the concentration ratio in this industry is relatively high—few 
firms are actively engaged in developing new molecular tests for organ transplant 
management, perhaps because of the small market size.  This high concentration ratio 
tends to decrease inter-firm rivalry because few firms are competing for the same 
consumer base.  Nevertheless, several firms are clear rivals to PROOF’s BiT program.   
XDx is a privately-held California-based company developing molecular tests for 
post-transplant patient management and for inflammatory diseases.  It is the only 
competitor in this industry to have received market approval for a diagnostic test.  The 
firm’s AlloMap is a PCR-based in vitro diagnostic multivariate index assay (IVDMIA) 
testing service that measures expression levels of a set of 20 genes in the blood in order 
to diagnose the absence of acute rejection.  The test was 510(k)-approved by the FDA in 
2008 for use in patients at least 2 months post-transplant, and retails at approximately 
$US 2950 (Evans et al., 2005).  AlloMap is non-inferior to the cardiac biopsy, the current 
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standard for heart transplant monitoring, and reduces unnecessary biopsies by identifying 
patients not undergoing acute organ rejection (Pham et al., 2010).  However, one certified 
central reference laboratory, managed by XDx, currently performs all AlloMap tests.  
This means that hospitals collect patient blood samples, ship them to the central lab, and 
must wait several days to receive results.  The test diagnoses the absence of acute 
rejection, but has no utility in identifying patients undergoing acute organ rejection. 
Moreover, regulators have approved it for use only after the first two months after 
transplant, after most acute rejection occurs.   
Despite these issues, XDx has enjoyed a first-mover advantage.  Doctors have 
adopted AlloMap into clinical use at 65 clinical sites in the US (~30% market uptake) 
(Ray, 2010).  XDx is also developing molecular tests for lung and kidney transplant 
management.  The firm will be able to leverage its AlloMap experience and revenues to 
move these other programs forward.  However, for now its focus is on full 
commercialization of AlloMap, and in this regard, it represents perhaps the most mature 
competitor for PROOF’s BiT program.  
While XDx is the only known competitor in the heart transplant management 
space, several other firms are developing biomarker panels for management of kidney 
transplant patients.  Rules Based Medicine (RBM), a Texas-based firm, is developing a 
molecular test for early diagnosis of kidney rejection in kidney transplant patients in 
partnership with The Scripps Research Institute and Northwestern University.   RBM 
already has a certified central laboratory, and the firm filed a registration of its intent to 
pursue a $90M IPO with the US Securities and Exchange Commission in December 2009 
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(Rules Based Medicine Inc., 2010).  Little information is publicly available about the 
development status for this potential competing test.   
 TcLand Expression, a privately held firm based in France, represents another 
competitor for PROOF’s BiT program.  TcLand is developing KRejX, a genomic panel 
intended to identify chronic rejection in kidney transplant recipients.  KRejX is currently 
in the clinical validation phase of development, and TcLand plans to commercialize it as 
a laboratory-designed test in TcLand’s central laboratory in 2011(TcLand Expression, 
2009).  Thus, there are several firms developing tests that could compete with PROOF’s 
BiT program.  In addition, many academic and public research laboratories are 
investigating biomarkers of kidney graft rejection, though these studies tend to be 
preclinical in nature (Hartono, Muthukumar, & Suthanthiran, 2010).   
Finally, molecular tests have high switching costs.  For any new products, 
regulators must be convinced of product safety, payers must believe there are health 
economic benefits, and laboratories and physicians adopt the technology.  Physicians 
who manage organ transplant patients are especially risk-averse owing to overwhelming 
desire to minimize potential harm to patients and precious transplanted organs.  This may 
create a bias towards adherence to currently used protocols, even when doctors generally 
regard them as insufficient.  The high switching costs in this industry tend to decrease 
rivalry because customers cannot and do not easily switch technologies once they have 
selected and are “locked into” a platform and a test.  This is particularly true when a new 
diagnostic requires adoption of a new platform technology, which may not be available or 
utilized within a hospital or central lab.    
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In summary, the market for molecular tests for managing heart and/or kidney 
transplant patients is relatively small and slowly growing.  The industry serving this 
market is highly concentrated, with only one test currently marketed and relatively few 
known competitors.  Rivals in this industry face high switching costs for buyers (i.e. 
physicians) who have already committed to a competing molecular test and associated 
platform.  Overall, this industry is thus characterized by a moderate degree of 
competition amongst rivals. 
2.4.3 Substitutes Exist for New Molecular Tests in this Industry 
Substitutes for new molecular tests in the heart and kidney transplantation arena 
take several forms, and collectively present a moderate to high threat.  The cocktail of 
immunosuppressants used to prevent rejection of transplanted organs is itself toxic.  This 
reality has driven the need for blood-based tests to predict rejection events such that 
physicians could decrease drug dosages and prevent organ toxicity if the risk of immune 
rejection were minimal.  Many firms are attempting to develop new, less toxic anti-
rejection drugs, which could obviate the need for such diagnostics.  For example, the US 
FDA approved Novartis’ everolimus, a newer version of a classical anti-rejection drug, in 
April 2010.  This drug may preserve kidney function and permit lower dosing of 
adjunctive anti-rejection drugs (Novartis Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2010). 
A second class of potential substitutes for new molecular tests for transplant 
patient management is other technologies for diagnosing/predicting organ rejection.  The 
most widely deployed current method for diagnosing heart and kidney rejection is biopsy, 
in which a physician removes and examines a small tissue sample for signs of rejection.  
This has been the gold standard for diagnosing organ rejection for many years, although 
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it is subject to reader interpretation and often does not diagnose rejection until it has 
progressed beyond reversal.  Despite these disadvantages, disrupting this generally 
accepted method will be difficult for firms developing new molecular tests.  Physicians 
may also use echocardiography and right heart catheterization to monitor transplanted 
heart function.   
Interestingly, an additional substitute that molecular tests may face is a vastly 
reduced number of biopsies in combination with increased clinical monitoring for 
reduced organ function.  A recent publication reported that monitoring heart transplant 
recipients with XDx’s AlloMap was no more effective than intensive clinical monitoring 
(Pham et al., 2010).  Thus, new molecular tests for managing organ transplant patients 
may compete with the notion that simple, inexpensive clinical monitoring of organ 
function is sufficient for identifying organ rejection.  
    Perhaps the most threatening substitute for new molecular tests for transplanted 
organ management is the development of drugs and technologies that eliminate the need 
for organ transplants.  Clinicians, health economists, and patient advocacy groups 
generally agree that human organ transplantation is hugely resource-intensive and would 
best be avoided altogether. Since the molecular tests industry essentially produces 
complementary assets for transplantation itself, any new drug/technology eliminating the 
need for transplantation would eliminate the need for associated molecular tests.  Such 
substitutes could include new drugs that prevent progression of or reverse heart and 
kidney disease, and/or regenerative medicine techniques for replacing lost organ function 
(for example, via artificial organs or transplantation of cells derived from the patient’s 
own stem cells).    
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In summary, the molecular tests for transplanted organ management industry 
faces a high threat of substitutes.  Potential substitutes are diverse and include the current 
gold standard, biopsy and pathological assessment, as well as newer, less toxic 
immunosuppressants, and technologies eliminating the need for human organ 
transplantation altogether.     
2.4.4 Buyers Hold Significant Power 
2.4.4.1 Payers 
The primary customers in the molecular tests market are the payers—largely 
public or private insurance companies.  Obtaining reimbursement by third-party payers, 
who will evaluate the cost and the value added by a new molecular test, is an essential 
step for new molecular tests to be successful.  The impetus is on the developer to begin to 
collect and analyze the data for these evaluations as early as possible in the development 
process.  Molecular tests for organ transplant patient management face a highly 
concentrated payer environment.  The U.S. Medicare and Medicaid systems together are 
the largest health care payer in the U.S., accounting for roughly 50% of American 
healthcare expenditures.  If a drug, device or instrument achieves covered by Medicare, it 
typically is eventually covered by the other private payers (Rosen, 2009), meaning that 
payers hold a very high degree of buyer power. 
Molecular tests also face a more challenging payer environment than do 
pharmaceuticals.  In the U.S., newly approved drugs are typically granted coverage by 
nearly all payers within a year of launch (Davis et al., 2009).  Achieving coverage for 
new molecular tests typically takes much longer.  For example, Oncotype Dx was 
approved in 2004, and yet is projected to achieve coverage by 100% of payers only in 
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2010 (Davis et al., 2009).  Moreover, the activities of regulatory authorities and payers 
are minimally coordinated, meaning that granting of regulatory approval has little bearing 
on whether payers will reimburse a new molecular test.  
In summary, health care expenditures are centralized and payers are highly price 
sensitive and slow to adopt.  This is especially true where the technology is new and/or 
expensive.  Payers demand clear demonstration of efficacy and cost-effectiveness in 
order to justify spending.  They therefore exercise significant control over makers of new 
molecular tests since reimbursement coverage is essential to induce doctors to order tests 
on behalf of their patients.   
2.4.4.2 Laboratories, Physicians, and Patients 
Hospital laboratories and central reference labs also exert power as the facilities 
that actually run new tests.  Laboratory technicians must be comfortable with the 
technology and have access to the platform necessary to implement it.  Their willingness 
to implement new technology depends on the market demand, which is ultimately driven 
by physicians.   
Physicians are the ultimate gatekeeper between molecular test developers and the 
patient.   In the US, physicians receive disproportionate financial incentive for procedure-
based services versus patient evaluation and management (Davis et al., 2009).  There is 
thus an economic disincentive for physicians to order molecular tests that could 
discourage further treatment.  For example, a test that indicates that a heart transplant 
patient is not likely to experience organ rejection eliminates the need for a diagnostic 
biopsy, for which a doctor would otherwise be reimbursed.  While most physicians are 
motivated to provide good patient care, this misalignment of incentives is nevertheless a 
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concern.  In addition, aside from a small community of early adopters, most physicians 
are conservative, and adopt new technologies only when the benefits are widely accepted 
by their peers.  As the parties that make the decision about whether to order new 
molecular tests, physicians must therefore be convinced of the clinical value of tests.    
While patients are the ultimate users of new molecular tests, they are not direct 
buyers.  Nevertheless, the internet has allowed many patients and their families to 
become stronger advocates for their own care, to the degree that they may exert some 
degree of influence over prescribing physicians.  Patient and public advocacy groups may 
also exert significant buyer power to push for lower-cost tests and wider access.  For 
example, the Dialysis Patient Citizens group has launched a campaign advocating that US 
Medicare institute guaranteed lifetime coverage of immunosuppressive drugs for kidney 
transplant patients (Dialysis Patient Citizens, 2009).  Moreover, 7 of the 23 patents held 
by Myriad Genetics on testing for the hereditary breast and ovarian cancer genes BRCA1 
and BRCA2 were recently deemed invalid in a case led by the American Civil Liberties 
Union and the Public Patent Foundation, who argued that Myriad was restricting patient 
access to essential genetic tests.  While Myriad has appealed this ruling, these examples 
highlight the susceptibility of firms operating in the molecular testing industry to patient 
pressure (Koppel, Wang, & Bray, 2010).  
In summary, firms developing new molecular tests for managing organ transplant 
patients find themselves subject to a high degree of buyer power, not only because of the 
concentrated and challenging payer environment but also because physicians are 
conservative in changing clinical practices.  However, buyer power is to some degree 
mitigated by patient advocacy and by the strong motivation for new solutions.  
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Physicians, hospital labs, and patients are all motivated to identify alternatives that could 
improve care of transplant patients, prolong organ function, and/or reduce downstream 
healthcare costs.  Thus for a new molecular test that offers a truly novel and cost-
effective solution to monitoring heart and kidney transplant rejection, buyer power may 
be reduced somewhat as patients and physicians demand access.   
2.4.5 Technology Suppliers Hold Significant Power 
The suppliers for new molecular tests are the manufacturers of the technology 
platform and components of the diagnostic tests.  They hold significant power over firms 
developing molecular tests for organ transplant management.  Many platform technology 
developers are realizing that they can capture more value if they sell the platform and 
molecular tests that utilize the platform.  There is a very real threat of technology 
platform makers forward integrating.  Luminex Corporation, a Texas-based developer of 
biological testing platforms, provides a useful example of this threat.  Luminex’s original 
revenue generation model combined:  (1) direct sales of its diagnostic platforms to 
hospital/reference laboratories; (2) sales of reagents and services associated with its 
platforms; and (3) licensing and royalty revenues collected from test developers that 
outlicensed Luminex’s xMAP Technology in order to develop and market multiplexed 
biological tests (Maloney, 2008).  However, in recent years Luminex has moved 
downstream to capture more value.  In 2007, Luminex acquired Tm Biosciences, a 
Toronto-based diagnostics firm developing tests for genetic disorders, drug metabolism, 
and infectious disease, in order to gain access to content for the Luminex platform 
(FinancialWire, 2007).  Thus, the molecular tests industry faces the threat of technology 
platform suppliers becoming “one stop shops” for platforms and the tests themselves.   
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A second facet of the power held by suppliers to the molecular tests industry is 
the switching costs associated with selecting a technology platform.  Firms typically 
develop diagnostic tests for a single platform, which itself requires regulatory approval 
for use in the clinic.  Once a test developer has selected a platform, there are enormous 
costs associated with switching platforms.  Developers would have to repeat test 
validation and regulatory approval processes on the new platform.  For a firm developing 
diagnostics, these products are inextricably tied to the platforms provided by suppliers, 
increasing supplier bargaining power substantially.   
The case of EraGen, a developer of multiplex assays for infectious disease, 
provides a useful illustrative example.  EraGen originally selected Luminex as its 
technology platform partner, and obtained the rights to develop test kits in specific 
disease indications using the Luminex technology (Butkus, 2010).  The firm was in the 
process of developing these tests when Luminex announced the Tm Biosciences 
acquisition.  Given that Tm Biosciences had a strong focus on infectious disease 
diagnostics, the deal effectively made Luminex a direct competitor to EraGen.  The two 
firms dissolved the licensing agreement, and EraGen had to seek out an alternative 
commercialization platform and redevelop its molecular tests.  In 2009, EraGen forged a 
partnership with Illumina, giving EraGen rights to develop its tests using Illumina’s 
BeadXpress platform (Butkus, 2010), but EraGen nevertheless lost significant time 
because its tests were “locked in” to the Luminex platform. 
2.4.6 Threat of New Entrants in the Biomarkers of Transplantation Sector 
There are significant disincentives for would-be entrants to this sector.  The 
industry is characterized by a high degree of patenting, a tactic firms utilize to help 
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defend products and platforms from copycats.  For example, XDx Inc. has been granted 
USPTO Patent #7691569, which encompasses “methods and compositions for diagnosing 
and monitoring transplant rejection” (Wohlgemuth, 2010).  There may not be sufficient 
legal room for new entrants to develop products or technologies similar to existing 
patented ones.  Even where there is, patent filing and defence are expensive and highly 
specialized activities, creating a barrier to entry.   
Although molecular tests such as XDx’s AlloMap may be able to command a 
high price ($3000 or more) and may have margins exceeding 70%, the capital-intensive 
nature of the industry also creates financial barriers for would-be entrants (Davis et al., 
2009).  This is especially true for molecular tests for organ transplant management, given 
the relatively small market size.  McKinsey & Company recently modelled a prototypical 
firm developing a new molecular test.  The average cost and time required for a new 
molecular test to achieve regulatory approval were $45 million and 5 years respectively 
(Davis et al., 2009).  Including the time to receiving payer coverage and widespread 
physician uptake increased these estimates to 6 and 8 years respectively.  The analysis 
found that the average 10-year net present value associated with a new molecular test is 
roughly $15M, but suggested that this estimate is highly sensitive to the time to achieve 
regulatory approval and payer coverage.  The diagnostics industry has historically been 
unattractive for investors, since the potential returns for an investor are much higher in 
drug development (Batchelder & Miller, 2006).  Although this is slowly changing, the 
capital required to fund discovery, validation, diagnostic test development, regulatory 
approval, and commercialization activities presents a significant barrier to new entrants to 
the industry. 
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The requirement for regulatory approval (discussed more fully in section 2.4.7) 
also presents barriers to entry.  It requires significant capital and expertise to pursue 
regulatory approval.  Moreover, incumbent firms benefit from economies of learning 
arising from having already navigated the regulatory pathway.     
The need to access critical inputs for biomarker discovery and molecular test 
development also presents a barrier to entry for new firms in this industry.  Access to 
patients, clinical data, and properly collected and banked biological samples requires 
deep relationships with clinicians.  While patient/sample access is also an issue for 
incumbents, the hurdles facing the new entrant who must acquire these “from scratch” are 
considerable.  Patient recruitment and clinical sample collection can add months or years, 
as well as considerable cost, to development timelines.  Moreover, the pool of heart and 
kidney transplant centres from which to draw patients is relatively small.     
Finally, incumbent firms that have previously brought a new molecular test 
through the development process may have economies of learning compared to new 
entrants, having been through the end-to-end process of test development and 
commercialization at least once.  It may be difficult for new entrants, all else being equal, 
to compete against entrenched expertise.  Thus overall, the threat of new entrants in the 
molecular tests industry is low.   
2.4.7 Governments Hold a High Degree of Influence over Industry Participants 
Governments exert a high degree of influence over the molecular tests industry in 
the form of regulatory oversight.  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates 
new drugs and diagnostics in the United States.  New drug candidates must pass through 
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Figure 2-4:  Regulatory Pathways for Diagnostics in the United States 
 
a defined, sequential series of regulatory phases prior to receiving marketing approval:  
an Investigational New Drug application; Phase I clinical trials, in which a drug’s safety 
is tested; Phase II clinical trials, in which efficacy data is gathered; Phase III clinical 
trials, in which the drug is tested head-to-head with the current standard of care; and 
Phase IV post-market surveillance.   
In comparison, the regulatory process is much less defined for new clinical tests. 
The FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiologic Health (CDRH) regulates new molecular 
tests.   In the general sense, firms must show that their tests detect what they claim to 
detect within specifications for accuracy, precision, sensitivity (ability to accurately 
Source:  by author 
identify true positives), and specificity (ability to accurately identify true negatives).  
However, the burden of proof required by FDA for regulatory approval depends on the 
intended purpose of the diagnostic (see Figure 2-4).  The designation assigned to a new 
diagnostic will determine how a firm can market it.  Firms can define and pursue 
approval for new diagnostics as in vitro diagnostics (IVDs), which are intended for 
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clinical use.  The FDA subclassifies IVDs themselves on the basis of perceived risk 
(Class I, which is lowest risk, to Class III, which is highest risk); for Class I and Class II 
diagnostics, the FDA will accept a 510k application, while Class III diagnostics typically 
require pre-market approval (PMA).  The PMA is a much more rigorous approval 
pathway requiring more time, money, and validatory clinical trials (Gibbs, 2008).   
Alternatively, firms can build or utilize an existing laboratory that is compliant 
with the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA) and avoid 
regulatory oversight altogether to market their diagnostics as ‘homebrew’ kits.  Firms can 
also develop diagnostics for research use only (RUO) or can sell components of a 
diagnostic kit individually as analyte-specific reagents (ASRs) that buyers can use to 
develop their own diagnostic kits.  Both of these pathways preclude physicians from 
using the kits/reagents clinically, but have minimal premarket requirements imposed by 
the FDA.  Thus compared to drug development, diagnostics face much more flexibility in 
selecting a regulatory strategy for new diagnostic development.   
It appears, however, that the window of opportunity for bypassing the most 
rigorous regulatory processes by introducing new molecular tests as a lab service is 
closing.  The FDA has begun to crack down on ASRs and laboratory-developed tests that 
are used for clinical diagnosis.  It has also indicated that while the 510(k) route will likely 
be acceptable for prognostic tests, PMA approval is likely to be required for tests that 
directly guide therapeutic decision-making.  It is widely believed that the FDA will soon 
require all IVDMIAs—molecular tests in which the output provided to the ordering 
physician is a score or index that guides diagnosis/prognosis/treatment, created by an 
algorithm to which the physician is blinded—to be approved via the PMA route.  
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The PMA process in the US can take up to three years and cost millions of dollars 
(Gibbs, 2008).  The European Medicines Evaluation Agency (EMEA) equivalent of the 
PMA or 510(k) is the CE mark, which firms generally regard as more rule-bound, but 
more transparent than the FDA processes.  While achieving CE certification is also costly 
and time-consuming, there is a perception that it may be easier to gain FDA approval if a 
product already holds CE certification.  Many firms pursue CE certification first, 
allowing them to generate revenues, establish a commercial presence, and gain additional 
product data while pursuing FDA approval.   
The time, cost, and burden of proving safety and efficacy to regulatory agencies is 
thus one of the biggest hurdles that developers of new molecular tests face in getting their 
products to market.  Regulatory requirements for diagnostics are complex and widely 
expected to become more stringent in the United States under the FDA, which tends to 
influence requirements demanded by other regulatory authorities.  A higher regulatory 
burden (and even the threat of stricter regulations) will have a significant impact on the 
attractiveness of the industry, since it will increase development times and costs, and 
thereby decrease profit potential for firms.   
2.4.8 Summary of External Analysis for Biomarkers of Transplantation 
The external influences impacting the molecular tests for organ transplantation 
management industry are summarized in Figure 2-5.  Broadly speaking, the molecular  
tests industry for organ disease appears unattractive to the outside investor.  Although the 
industry is relatively new, development efforts are costly and time-consuming relative to  
other investment alternatives.  Buyers—payers, physicians, and patients—bear  
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• Small market size (+)
• Slow market growth (+)
• Highly concentrated; only one commercialized product (-)
• High switching costs once physicians have adopted test (-)
Industry Competition:  Moderate
• High degree of patenting (-)
• Patients/samples are essential complementary assets (-)
• Capital/time-intensive (-)
• Regulatory uncertainty (-)
• Economies of learning (-)
• Small market size (-)
Threat of New Entrants:  Low
• Payers are concentrated and highly price-sensitive (++)
• Patient advocacy influence on doctors and payers (-)
• Doctors are conservative (+)
• Strong motivation for better alternatives (-)
Bargaining Power of Buyers: Moderate to High
• Biopsy/clinical assessment are entrenched (+)
• Stem cells and artificial organs being developed (+)
• Better immunosuppressants and drugs that prevent disease progression 
being developed (+)
Threat of Substitutes:  High
• Regulatory authority (+)
• Threat of changing regulatory requirement (+)
Influence of Government:  High
• High platform switching costs (+)
• Suppliers are forward integrating (+)
Bargaining Power of Suppliers:  High
considerable power, as do suppliers of platform technologies underlying new diagnostics.  
Moreover, significant barriers exist in the form of governmental regulatory authorities, 
distribution channels, and clinical uptake.  There is also a strong desire for alternatives to 
organ transplantation amongst all stakeholder groups, and such alternatives would 
obviate the need for transplant-associated tests, including those PROOF is developing.  
Nevertheless, transplant alternatives are still a significant way from clinical 
Figure 2-5:  Summary of Competitive Forces Impacting the Molecular Tests for 
Organ Transplant Patient Management Industry 
Source:  by author 
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implementation, and there is a strong desire to improve patient care and outcomes in the 
current organ transplant setting.  Thus for the organization that believes its molecular 
tests to be more efficacious than alternatives, protected from infringement by 
competitors, and cost-effective from a health economics standpoint, this may be an 
attractive industry indeed.   
2.5 Biomarkers of Chronic Kidney Disease 
2.5.1 Overview of PROOF’s Biomarkers in Chronic Kidney Disease Program 
Chronic kidney disease (CKD) is characterized by progressive loss of kidney 
function, often arising as a complication of another disease.  Diabetes is the most 
common cause of CKD, accounting for nearly half of new diagnoses (Evans et al., 2005).  
Physicians typically diagnose CKD using a blood test for creatinine, since gradual 
elevations in blood creatinine levels are indicative of decreased ability of the kidney to 
filter out waste products.  However, patients with CKD can have drastically different 
disease outcomes:  some patients have stable disease that never worsens; others will 
progress to end stage disease requiring dialysis or transplantation; some will develop 
secondary cardiovascular disease (CVD); and a fourth group will have very rapidly 
progressive disease leading to death (Rodriguez et al., 2010).  While some clinical 
parameters (e.g. age, gender, ethnicity, and diabetes status) may predict disease outcome, 
clinicians currently have a limited ability to identify the likely disease trajectory of newly 
diagnosed CKD and implement a trajectory-appropriate disease management strategy.  
PROOF’s biomarkers in CKD program is operating in the kidney disease 
molecular tests industry.  The goal of the program is to identify and validate genomic and 
proteomic biomarkers of CKD severity using blood samples collected from a cohort of 
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CKD patients having known disease outcomes.  PROOF intends to develop biomarkers 
that will identify:  (1) patients having rapidly progressing CKD, in order that they may be 
treated aggressively; (2) patients who are unlikely to progress to organ failure, in order to 
minimize unnecessary treatment; and (3) patients likely to progress to CVD, in order to 
increase the CVD monitoring and prevention component of their treatment plans.   
    The molecular tests for CKD industry is in its infancy.  Regulatory processes 
guiding acceptance of new products remain unclear, and even with a large and growing 
market size, there are no known molecular tests currently approved for clinical use.  
Multiple firms, as well as many academic, clinical, and publicly-funded laboratories, are 
working to discover and develop biomarkers of CKD progression; however, most of 
these efforts are at the early stages.  Thus, the industry as a whole has a moderate 
concentration ratio, and is characterized by negative cash flows and unprofitability 
arising from resource-intensive new product development.      
2.5.2 Competition in Biomarkers of Chronic Kidney Disease 
The market for prognostic biomarker tests for CKD is large and rapidly 
increasing.  Roughly 20 million patients have CKD in the United States, while in Canada 
CKD affects 1.9 to 2.3 million individuals (Levin et al., 2008).  In most countries CKD 
prevalence is predicted to increase in coming years (Kronenberg, 2009), driven largely by 
increasing incidence of diabetes.  Since there is room in a large and growing market for 
different firms to establish a market niche for their products, these factors tend to 
decrease competition.   
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Despite the large market size, this industry is moderately concentrated.  There are 
no known biomarker-based molecular tests for CKD currently on the market, but many 
firms have established a presence in the CKD market with related products, and/or are 
developing prognostic tests for CKD.  In addition, many academic and clinical 
laboratories and institutes have identified biomarkers of CKD progression (Kronenberg, 
2009).  This moderate degree of concentration means that many firms are competing to 
be the first to market.  Moreover, many of these biomarker development programs are in 
the investigational stage, with evidence that is insufficient for translation into broad 
clinical use in the prediction of CKD progression.   
Nevertheless, several firms deserve particular notice as potential competitors to 
PROOF’s biomarkers of CKD program.  Rules-Based Medicine launched a multiplexed 
predictive biomarker test for human kidney toxicity (Human Kidney MAP) in 2009 
(Rules Based Medicine Inc., 2010).  The panel is comprised of 16 biomarkers of acute 
kidney injury (i.e. not CKD) and is intended to reveal early signs of drug-induced kidney 
damage in order to wean out toxic drugs earlier in the development process and to guide 
drug dosing.  Nevertheless, at least a portion of this panel could be transferrable to a 
panel of prognostic biomarkers for CKD if validated in this population.  
SomaLogic, a Boulder, CO-based biotechnology firm, represents a second 
potential competitor for PROOF’s CKD biomarker program.  SomaLogic is using 
aptamer technology to identify novel biomarkers, and recently disclosed the discovery of 
58 potential new biomarkers of CKD progression (Gold, L. Ayers, D. Bertino, J. et al., 
2010).   The firm is also developing a lung cancer diagnostic in partnership with Quest 
Diagnostics, one of the largest global laboratory test providers, which is to reach the 
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market in 2012 and could provide revenues for further development of the CKD panel 
(Petrone, 2010).  Indeed, Quest holds an equity stake in SomaLogic, which could provide 
the latter with a direct path to market for the new molecular tests it is developing.   
A final deterrent to rivalry in the molecular tests for CKD industry is the high 
switching costs associated with new tests.  As has been noted, regulators must be 
convinced of product safety, payers must be assured of a health economic benefit, and 
laboratories and risk-averse physicians must learn to utilize the technology and adopt the 
product into standard clinical practice.  These switching costs tend to decrease rivalry 
because customers cannot easily switch technologies once they have selected a platform 
and a test.     
In summary, the market for molecular tests for predicting CKD outcomes is large 
and rapidly growing, particularly as diabetes incidence increases worldwide.  The 
industry serving this market is fragmented, with no molecular tests currently marketed for 
CKD prognosis.  Although several notable rivals are developing biomarker panels that 
may compete with PROOF’s program, any players in this industry will face high buyer 
switching costs once physicians and laboratories have adopted a competing molecular 
test.  Thus overall, this industry is characterized by a low degree of competition amongst 
rivals. 
2.5.3 There is a Moderate Threat of Substitution 
There are multiple potential substitutes for molecular tests for the prognosis of 
CKD, and together they present a moderate threat.  Perhaps the most significant threat is 
presented by better treatment of the conditions that commonly lead to CKD—particularly 
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diabetes.  Worldwide prevalence of diabetes, especially Type 2 diabetes, is predicted to 
more than double between 2000 and 2030 (Srivastava et al., 2008), and prevalence of 
CKD secondary to diabetes will also increase.  However, intensive diabetes management 
(i.e. maintaining blood glucose levels within a tight range through pharmaceutical, diet, 
and/or exercise interventions) has been estimated to reduce diabetes-associated CKD 
development by up to 50% (The Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research 
Group, 1993).  Therefore, a shift towards prevention and better treatment of diabetes 
could effectively shrink the population of CKD patients and reduce the need for 
diagnostics predicting CKD outcomes. 
  New drugs in the diabetes market have the potential to yield multi-billion dollar 
annual revenues (Srivastava et al., 2008).  Given this immense market potential, virtually 
all major pharmaceutical companies are investing heavily in research and development of 
new diabetes drugs.  For example, multiple firms are developing or marketing new 
diabetes therapies based on raising and/or stabilizing circulating levels of the hormone 
glucagon-like peptide-1, which improves glucose control and possibly long-term 
pancreas function in diabetes patients (Evans et al., 2005).  These efforts could delay or 
prevent CKD development in this population.  The same is true for the many cell 
replacement, stem cell, next generation insulin delivery, and artificial organ strategies 
under investigation.  While many of these potential substitutes are still in the 
developmental stage, the strong motivation for new and better diabetes treatments—and 
ideally cures—is ultimately likely to reduce the burden of CKD in this population. 
The cornerstone of current CKD management is treatment of the original disease 
where possible, and treatment with blood pressure regulating drugs and ACE inhibitors.  
  41 
In some patients, these drugs themselves are themselves associated with progressive loss 
of kidney function.  Thus, a major driver of demand for prognostic biomarkers for CKD 
is the toxicity of currently used treatments.  Ideally, physicians would like to be able to 
identify patients with stable disease who do not need aggressive and potentially toxic 
treatment.  The advent of newer drugs that treat CKD with less toxicity could obviate the 
need for prognostic biomarkers by reducing the fear of treatment-related toxicity.  Newer, 
more effective drugs for CKD could also reduce the need for biomarker-based tests 
identifying disease prognosis.  For example, Reata Pharmaceuticals is developing 
bardoxolone methyl, a first-in-class inflammatory modulator, which improved kidney 
function in diabetics with advanced CKD in Phase II trials.  This study will be complete 
in mid-2010, and a second trial in CKD patients with diabetes will begin in late 2010.  
The firm recently raised an additional $78M in funding that will see it through to NDA 
filing for bardoxolone (Carroll, 2010).  Several other novel compounds, including 
olmesartan medoxomil, sulodexide, and avosentan, are also under development by other 
firms for CKD treatment.  In addition, greater public knowledge about risk factors and 
prevention strategies for CKD (for example, dietary modification and smoking cessation) 
could reduce CKD incidence and therefore the need for prognostic tests. 
While organ transplantation is a commonly used and relatively successful 
treatment for end stage CKD patients, there is a very limited supply of organs available 
for transplant, and this treatment is very costly.  Kidney transplantation cannot 
realistically be widely implemented amongst CKD patients as a means of restoring 
kidney function.  It is therefore not a viable substitute for molecular tests predicting CKD 
outcomes.  However, several technologies may be useful in predicting CKD progression 
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and could serve as substitutes for new molecular diagnostics for CKD.  Renal biopsy may 
have some utility, but as has been discussed, is expensive, uncomfortable for the patient, 
and subject to physician interpretation.  Abdominal ultrasound and advanced nuclear 
medicine technologies including positron emission tomography (PET) and combined 
PET/CT imaging may be useful in determining CKD prognosis, although this requires 
further study.  Thus, to summarize, new molecular tests for CKD prognosis face a 
moderate threat of substitution, with the most significant threat arising from CKD 
prevention efforts and improved treatments and possibly cures for diabetes.   
2.5.4 Buyers Hold a High Degree of Power 
Customers in the molecular tests for CKD industry hold similar power as has been 
described for new molecular tests for management of organ transplant patients.  Payers 
are a key customer, and they are concentrated and highly price-sensitive, requiring 
detailed economic justification demonstrating the value of a new molecular test.  Without 
reimbursement, it is very difficult for manufacturers of new molecular tests to induce 
adoption of the tests.  Physicians, as the gatekeepers that ultimately decide whether to 
order a prognostic molecular test for a newly diagnosed CKD patient, are crucial 
customers as well.  They do not hold direct influence over new product pricing.  
However, physicians are typically conservative, and must be convinced of the value that 
molecular tests for CKD will provide by allowing them to more accurately predict 
disease outcomes, and thus design more appropriate treatment plans, for their CKD 
patients.  Without this conviction, physicians will choose not to utilize new tests.  
Physician demand for new molecular tests for CKD prognosis in turn drives uptake by 
the hospital and central laboratories that actually perform the tests.  Where molecular 
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testing platforms are expensive and/or use new technology, industry participants face 
even more challenges in inducing uptake by physicians and laboratories.  Finally, patient 
groups that advocate for better patient care and outcomes hold some influence over 
doctors and payers, and may indirectly reduce the power held by these customers.    
Although payers, physicians, and laboratories all hold strong buying power in the 
market for new CKD prognostics, the strong motivation for better treatments and 
outcomes for CKD patients mitigates this power to some degree.  Physicians are 
generally motivated to treat their patients as effectively as possible.  Moreover, the cost 
of treating end-stage renal disease (ESRD) is overwhelming; indeed, ESRD programs are 
estimated to account for 6.7% of total Medicare spending in the US, and Medicare costs 
associated with ESRD increased by an alarming 57% between 1999 and 2004 (Foley & 
Collins, 2007).  Thus, there is strong economic incentive for payers to seek out and 
approve reimbursement for new molecular tests that accurate predict CKD outcomes. 
Such tests would allow aggressive treatment of patients with rapidly progressing disease, 
delaying their progression to ESRD, and would reduce costly and unnecessary treatment 
of patients with stable CKD. The ethical and economic necessity for better prognostics 
for CKD therefore moderate the power held by payers and physicians in this industry.    
2.5.5 Technology Suppliers Hold Significant Power 
As has been discussed for molecular tests for organ transplant patient 
management, the major suppliers for the new molecular tests for CKD industry are 
technology platform manufacturers. Technology platform developers include major 
pharmaceutical companies such as Roche, as well as specialized technology developers 
such as Luminex and Illumina. Platform developers in general are forward integrating, 
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hoping to capture more value by marketing not only their technology platforms, but also 
the molecular tests utilizing their platforms. In addition, developers of new molecular 
tests for CKD prognosis face very high platform switching costs—once firms have 
selected a technology platform supplier and have begun the development and regulatory 
processes necessary to bring their new tests to market, it is costly and time-consuming to 
switch platforms. Thus technology platform suppliers hold significant power over firms 
developing molecular tests for CKD management, permitting them to extract higher rents 
and more favourable deal structures than might otherwise be possible.   
2.5.6 There is Little Threat of New Entrants 
Would-be entrants to the molecular tests for CKD management industry face very 
high barriers to entry.  These have been discussed in detail previously (see section 2.4.6) 
and will be reviewed here only briefly.  First, new entrants face high patent barriers 
erected by incumbent firms.  Firms hoping to develop new molecular tests for CKD are 
also dependent on access to patients/samples, which are essential complementary assets.  
Given the huge patient population having CKD, this may be less of an issue than in the 
molecular tests for organ transplant patient management industry.  The significant capital 
requirements, the long time horizon reasonably required for a return on investment, and 
the high degree of regulatory uncertainty in this industry all present formidable barriers to 
entry.  Already established incumbent firms, who may be able to capitalize on knowledge 
gains from bringing previous related products to market, have a clear advantage.   
Despite these realities, there has been significant interest in entering this market. 
In part, this is due to the large and growing market size, but new entrants have also been 
incentivized by funding agencies and governments. For example, in 2009 the US 
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National Institutes of Health (NIH) announced that it would award $12.5 million in 
funding over the next five years to organizations to discover and validate biomarkers of 
CKD (GenomeWeb Daily News, 2009). Thus, the firm believing it has a scientifically 
sound biomarker panel for predicting CKD progression is likely to believe that it can be 
profitable in this industry despite the numerous disincentives to new entrants.      
2.5.7 Government Regulators are Highly Influential 
As has been discussed, new molecular tests are highly regulated by governments 
in the interest of protecting public safety, and regulatory requirements for these tests are 
complex, require specialized knowledge, and are widely expected to become more 
burdensome in the US and elsewhere. The threat of stricter regulatory requirements 
negatively impacts the attractiveness of this industry since it will increase the cost and 
time required to develop new molecular tests. Thus, the requirement to prove safety and 
efficacy to government regulators presents one of the largest hurdles to developers of 
new molecular tests for CKD management face bringing their products to the market.  
2.5.8 Summary of External Analysis for Biomarkers of Chronic Kidney Disease 
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• Huge and rapidly growing market (-)
• Moderately concentrated  with no known commercialized product (-)
• High switching costs once physicians have adopted test (-)
Industry Competition:  Low
• High degree of patenting (-)
• Patients/samples are essential complementary assets (-)
• Capital/time-intensive (-)
• Regulatory uncertainty (-)
• Economies of learning (-)
• Strong motivation for better solutions (+)
Threat of New Entrants:  Low
• Payers are concentrated and highly price-sensitive (++)
• Patient advocacy influence on doctors and payers (-)
• Doctors are conservative (+)
• Strong motivation for better alternatives (-)
Bargaining Power of Buyers: High
• New, better drugs that prevent and/or reverse progression are in 
development (+)
• Artificial organs/cell transplants are in development (+)
• Both options are some time away (-)
• Other clinical monitoring modalities?
• Transplantation has limited practical utility as a substitute (-)
Threat of Substitutes:  Moderate
• Regulatory authority (+)
• Threat of changing regulatory requirement (+)
Influence of Government:  High
• High platform switching costs (+)
• Suppliers are forward integrating (+)
Bargaining Power of Suppliers:  High
The external influences in the molecular tests for CKD management industry are 
summarized in Figure 2-6, and together, paint an unattractive picture of this industry. The 
industry is still new and fragmented, with no known products approved for clinical use, 
although it has strong growth potential based on projected CKD prevalence. 
Nevertheless, development efforts in this industry are costly and time-consuming relative  
to other investment alternatives, and multiple potential substitutes exist. The most notable 
Figure 2-6:  Summary of Competitive Forces Impacting the Biomarkers of 
Chronic Kidney Disease Industry 
Source:  by author  
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of these is better treatment and prevention of diabetes, which would reduce CKD 
prevalence if effectively implemented. Customers (particularly payers and physicians)  
and suppliers of platform technologies underlying new molecular tests both hold 
significant power. Moreover, significant barriers exist in the form of governmental 
regulatory authorities, distribution channels, and clinical uptake.   
The negative features of the industry are somewhat countered by the growing 
recognition of the socioeconomic burden that CKD presents. As payers attempt to reduce 
long-term health care costs and physicians strive for better patient care, willingness to 
pay for truly effective diagnostics that will improve patient care is increasing. Thus for 
the organization that believes its prognostic tests for CKD to be more efficacious than 
potential substitutes, protected from infringement by competitors, and cost-effective from 
a payer perspective, this is an attractive industry despite the challenges it presents.   
2.6 Biomarkers of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease 
2.6.1 Overview of PROOF’s Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease Program 
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) is characterized by progressive 
airway limitation and loss of lung function. In the US, it affects at least 12 million people, 
and is the fourth leading cause of death (National Heart Lung and Blood Institute, 2010). 
COPD is also the number one reason why people become sick enough to be hospitalized, 
and thus represents a large burden on the health care system. It is expected that global 
prevalence of COPD will continue rising, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries. The biggest driver of this increase is cigarette smoking. 
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COPD is most commonly diagnosed when the forced expiratory volume in one 
second (FEV1) test shows a >20% reduction in the amount of air that can normally be 
expelled from the airways (Stockley, 2007). However, FEV1 is by definition an 
irreversible marker of disease progression, and thus is a poor surrogate marker by which 
to judge the efficacy of new COPD therapies. There is a desperate need for new therapies 
for COPD, given that existing drugs relieve symptoms of the disease but do not slow 
down or reverse declining lung function. However, many pharmaceutical companies have 
scaled back COPD drug development efforts until researchers identify more suitable 
surrogate markers of disease progression and reversal.   
PROOF’s COPD biomarker program operates in the biomarkers for COPD drug 
development and patient management industry; the program goal is to discover novel 
biomarkers of lung function that can enhance or replace FEV1. The first goal is to 
develop biomarkers into prognostic tests that differentiate between rapidly and slowly 
progressing disease, allowing physicians to match the degree of treatment and patient 
follow-up to a patient’s individual risk. A second goal is to develop biomarkers for use as 
surrogate markers of drug efficacy in early clinical trials, to allow pharmaceutical 
companies to gain an earlier indication of whether a drug candidate is worth investing the 
resources necessary to pursue full clinical development.   
The industry encompassing biomarkers for drug development and patient 
management in COPD is relatively new. The regulatory burden is significant and 
changing. Given the strong demand for drug development biomarkers and the large 
COPD patient population, many organizations are developing biomarkers of COPD. 
However, most of these efforts are in the developmental stages, and no multiplexed 
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COPD diagnostic/prognostic tests have reached the market thus far. Therefore, the 
industry as a whole is in the embryonic stages, and is experiencing negative cash flows 
and unprofitability arising from new product development.   
2.6.2 Competition is Moderate in this Industry 
The market for biomarker-based tests and drug development biomarkers for 
COPD is largely determined by incidence of COPD.  As has been discussed, COPD 
affects a large and rapidly growing number of people, so there is a robust end market for 
new molecular tests for COPD management.  In such an environment, inter-firm rivalry 
tends to be decreased since the market can likely be divided into segments that are 
profitable for multiple competing firms.     
However, many firms and laboratories have COPD biomarker discovery/ 
development programs, meaning that the concentration ratio in this industry is low and 
driving up rivalry.  For example, an NIH-funded team at Cornell University has identified 
a set of genetic biomarkers which may have utility in identifying those smokers most 
likely to develop COPD (iBridge Network, 2010).  Most of these efforts are at the early 
developmental stage, so there is little information available with which to assess their 
commercial potential.  Others—for example, the COPD biomarker discovery 
collaboration between American firms GenData and Batelle (Battelle Memorial Institute, 
2004)—have been announced, but no results have been reported.      
As has been discussed for other industries, a deterrent to rivalry in the biomarkers 
and molecular tests for COPD industry is the high switching costs associated with new 
tests. Regulators must be convinced of product safety, payers must believe there is a 
  50 
health economic benefit, and laboratories and risk-averse physicians must learn to utilize 
the technology and adopt the product into standard clinical practice. These switching 
costs tend to decrease rivalry because customers cannot easily switch technologies once 
they have selected a test. This does not apply to pharmaceutical companies consuming 
COPD biomarkers to support drug development activities, however—in this case, 
switching costs are relatively low.     
In summary, the COPD market is large and rapidly growing. Although no 
molecular tests are on the market for COPD management, multiple firms are developing 
them, as well as biomarkers for COPD drug development. All industry participants will 
face high buyer switching costs once physicians and laboratories have adopted a 
competing molecular test. Thus, biomarkers and molecular tests for COPD drug 
development and clinical management face a moderate degree of competition. 
2.6.3 Substitutes Present a Moderate Threat 
There is consensus amongst clinicians that currently available substitutes for new 
molecular tests for COPD are insufficient. As noted above, FEV1 is widely utilized in the 
clinic, but physicians regard it poorly as a diagnostic. Unfortunately, there are few 
treatment alternatives with which to follow up diagnosis or prognosis of COPD. There is 
therefore a perception that physicians can do little to treat this disease even if they make 
an accurate diagnosis/prognosis. In other words, new molecular tests for diagnosing 
COPD effectively compete with the perception that no diagnosis is a viable and sensible 
“treatment” option. This will change as firms develop new drugs for COPD, although the 
pipeline for new COPD drugs is relatively lean. Only 34 new COPD drugs were under 
development in the US in 2009, compared to 235 for diabetes, despite comparable 
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affected patient populations (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of America, 2010). 
Nevertheless, there are several promising drugs in late-stage development. Perhaps the 
most notable is Nycomed’s roflumilast, a novel anti-inflammatory treatment for COPD, 
which regulators approved for use in the EU in July 2010 (Nycomed Inc., 2010) and 
which the FDA is currently reviewing. More effective and/or less toxic COPD drugs may 
serve as substitutes for prognostic tests if they are effective in all COPD patients, 
regardless of disease severity/subtype. 
New molecular tests for COPD diagnosis/prognosis also face substitutes in the 
form of diagnostic imaging (for example, chest x-ray and CT scanning), although these 
have not been widely adopted. Physiological measures of lung function may also have 
utility in diagnosing COPD and predicting outcomes. These include:  blood oxygenation 
levels (measured via oximetry); six minute walking distance (a surrogate marker for 
exercise capacity); and the BODE score, which integrates four known risk parameters 
(body mass index, airflow obstruction, dyspnea, and exercise capacity) (Celli et al., 
2004). This latter class of potential substitutes has the advantage of being easy to 
implement in community-based settings (i.e. family physician’s offices) because they 
require minimal specialized equipment/training. However, the true diagnostic/prognostic 
value of such alternatives to FEV1 still requires further study.   
Finally, more effective prevention strategies for COPD and curative therapies 
may also serve as indirect substitutes for molecular tests for COPD diagnosis/prognosis. 
Smoking is the leading cause of COPD, and effective public education and smoking 
cessation programs are likely to reduce incidence of COPD, albeit over a long timeframe 
(Yasothan & Kar, 2008). Several firms are working to develop cures for COPD. Osiris 
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Therapeutics, for example, is conducting a Phase II clinical trial investigating the ability 
of stem cells to repair lung tissue in COPD patients (Diamond, 2010). While regulatory 
agencies will impose a very high burden of safety data prior to accepting stem cell-based 
treatments, curative therapies would eliminate the need to diagnose or predict outcomes 
of COPD via molecular tests.    
The second goal of PROOF’s COPD program is to develop biomarkers for drug 
development. Drug developers need biomarkers to serve as surrogate disease endpoints, 
for pharmacokinetic analyses, and for target validation (see Figure 2-2).  There is a low 
threat of substitution for this type of COPD biomarkers since no alternatives exist. 
In summary, new molecular tests for COPD management face a moderate threat 
of substitution. FEV1 testing is the current standard, but is insufficient. Diagnostic 
imaging and physiological measurements may offer alternatives to new molecular tests, 
and so long as there are poor treatment options for COPD, choosing not to 
diagnose/prognose potential COPD remains an option. Finally, there are few if any 
alternatives to drug development biomarkers of COPD progression; COPD biomarkers 
for this purpose thus face a low threat of substitution.     
2.6.4 Buyers are Desperate for New Solutions in this Industry 
Participants in the biomarkers of COPD industry face low to moderate buyer 
power. As has been discussed, the major buyers for new molecular tests (in this case, for 
COPD management) are payers, physicians, and hospitals/laboratories, all of whom hold 
considerable power over test developers. However, several factors moderate this power. 
First, the price power exerted by payers on test developers is somewhat limited by the 
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motivation of health insurers to reduce downstream healthcare costs. COPD affects more 
than 6 percent of adults in the U.S., and accounts for $32 billion in direct health care 
costs (Lindenauer et al., 2010). Payers therefore have strong incentive to reimburse new 
molecular tests that facilitate accurate diagnosis and prognosis of COPD, since these tests 
will allow earlier intervention, aggressive treatment of patients with severe disease, and 
prevention of costly COPD exacerbations.   
Secondly, strong patient advocacy groups and physician motivation to diagnose 
and treat patients more effectively decreases the power exerted by hospitals and 
gatekeeper pphysicians. This is particularly true for COPD, given the poor prognostic 
options currently available.  Finally, in the area of biomarkers for COPD drug 
development, pharmaceutical companies are the buyers.  These firms have a strong need 
for better surrogate markers for disease endpoints in order to allow them to identify and 
terminate unpromising COPD drug candidates earlier, and to identify and direct resources 
towards the most promising drug candidates.  As consumers of COPD biomarkers, they 
therefore exert minimal buying power over biomarker developers.   
2.6.5 Suppliers Hold Significant Power 
The suppliers that support the industry in biomarkers for COPD are primarily 
technology platform manufacturers. As has been discussed, platform developers in 
general are forward integrating, hoping to capture more value by marketing not only their 
technology platforms, but also the molecular tests utilizing their platforms. In addition, 
once firms have selected a technology platform supplier and have begun the development 
and regulatory processes necessary to bring their new tests to market, it is costly and 
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time-consuming to switch platforms. Thus, technology platform suppliers hold a high 
degree of power over firms developing molecular tests for COPD management.   
2.6.6 New Entrants Present a Moderate Threat 
Many of the threats to would-be entrants to the industry in biomarkers for COPD 
have been previously reviewed (see section 2.4.6).  New entrants face high barriers to 
entry in the form of existing patents, access to patients/samples (which are essential 
complementary assets), huge capital requirements, and long time horizons.  The 
regulatory uncertainty surrounding the industry is a major disincentive for new entrants, 
though notably this is not an issue for drug development biomarkers, which carry a much 
lower regulatory burden of proof than biomarkers for use in clinical tests.   
Despite these barriers to entry, there has been significant interest in entering this 
market for two key reasons:  a large and growing market size, and strong demand from 
pharmaceutical companies for drug development markers to support internal portfolio 
management and decision-making. This strong demand to some degree counterbalances 
the barriers which would-be entrants face, and provides incentive for new firms to enter 
this industry. Overall, incumbent firms operating in the biomarkers for COPD industry 
therefore face a moderate threat of new entrants.          
2.6.7 Government Regulators Wield Significant Power 
As has been discussed, new molecular tests are highly regulated, meaning that 
government authorities hold significant influence over test developers. Regulations for 
molecular tests are widely expected to become more burdensome in the US. However, 
there is a markedly reduced regulatory burden placed on biomarkers intended for non-
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clinical purposes such as drug development and pharmaceutical portfolio management. 
Thus in the biomarkers for COPD industry, where a major focus has been on producing 
biomarkers to support drug development, the influence of regulatory agencies is 
somewhat lower than in industries focused more exclusively on molecular tests. 
Nevertheless, demonstrating safety and efficacy to government regulators remains one of 
the largest hurdles for developers of molecular tests for COPD management.   
2.6.8 Summary of External Analysis for Biomarkers of Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease 
The external factors influencing the industry in biomarkers for COPD are 
summarized in Figure 2-7; on the whole, this industry appears unattractive to the outside 
investor, though less so when the subsector of the industry focused on developing COPD 
biomarkers to drug development is considered. The industry is relatively new and has 
strong growth potential, though development efforts are costly and time-consuming. 
Platform technology suppliers, as well as certain buyers—payers, physicians, and 
hospitals/laboratories—bear considerable power. However, pharmaceutical companies 
serving as buyers for biomarkers for COPD drug development hold minimal power, and 
this subsection of the industry faces a much lower governmental regulatory burden than 
that subsection developing molecular tests for COPD. Despite these realities, there is 
strong agreement that FEV1 is insufficient as a diagnostic, and that current COPD 
management leaves much to be desired. Thus, firms that believe they have discovered 
and validated a sound panel of biomarkers for use in COPD drug development and/or 
molecular test development may have strong incentive to enter this industry.      
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• Large and growing end market (-)
• High switching costs once physicians have adopted test (-)
• Many firms and labs developing biomarkers—NIH trial etc. (+)
Industry Competition:  Moderate
• High degree of patenting (-)
• Patients/samples are essential complementary assets (-)
• Capital/time-intensive (-)
• Regulatory uncertainty (-)
• Economies of learning (-)
• Huge demand from pharma (++)
Threat of New Entrants:  Moderate
• Pharma is a desperate for biomarkers for drug development (-)
• Payers are motivated to reduce downstream costs (-)
• Payers are price-sensitive and highly concentrated (++)
• Strong patient advocacy vs. doctors and payers (-)
• Physicians are motivated to adopt better alternatives (-)
Bargaining Power of Buyers: Low to Moderate
• “Do nothing” is perceived to be an alternative (+)
• FEV1 is used but is regarded as very poor (+/-)
• Diagnostic imaging and physiological measures (+/-)
• Curative treatments and new drugs are under development (+/-)
• No good alternatives for biomarkers for drug development (-)
Threat of Substitutes:  Moderate
• Regulatory authority (+)
• Reduced regulatory influence for non-clinical biomarkers (-)
• Threat of changing regulatory requirement (+)
Influence of Government:  High
• High platform switching costs (+)
• Suppliers are forward integrating (+)
Bargaining Power of Suppliers:  High
 
 
Figure 2-7:  Summary of External Forces In the Biomarkers of COPD Industry 
Source:  by author 
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2.7 Biomarkers of Chronic Heart Failure 
2.7.1 Overview of PROOF’s Chronic Heart Failure Program 
Chronic heart failure (HF) is a progressive disease arising when the heart is 
unable to fill and/or pump blood sufficiently, often secondary to cardiovascular disease 
(e.g. coronary artery disease, hypertension). Common symptoms include shortness of 
breath and reduced exercise capacity. Symptomatic HF affects up to 2% of the general 
population, and up to 10% of the elderly population, and is responsible for more 6.5 
million days spent in the hospital annually in the US (Kaye & Krum, 2007). Because HF 
impacts mostly elderly patients, prevalence of HF will rise significantly as the population 
ages and as more patients survive preceding cardiac events (Hunt et al., 2005). Given that 
the annual fully loaded cost associated with HF in the US is nearly $30 billion, there is 
significant interest in treating the disease more cost-effectively (Hunt et al., 2005).   
Current diagnostic approaches are imaging-based (echocardiography, MRI, CT) 
and require patients to travel to tertiary care centres for diagnosis. Once diagnosed, HF is 
treated with some combination of lifestyle modification (e.g. smoking cessation and 
exercise), pharmaceuticals (e.g. beta-blockers, angiotensin-converting enzyme 
inhibitors), and medical devices (e.g. implantable defibrillators) (Gerson, Abdallah, 
Muth, & Costea, 2010). Heart failure can be diastolic or systolic in nature, and while 
many therapies exist for systolic heart failure (SHF), these are ineffective in patients with 
diastolic heart failure (DHF). This means that many DHF patients gain no benefit from 
their drug regimens, and indeed are exposed to potentially harmful drugs unnecessarily. 
However, though the etiology of these different forms of the disease may differ, their 
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clinical presentation is often similar, making it difficult for physicians to determine which 
form of the disease patients have. 
PROOF’s biomarkers for HF program competes in the molecular tests for HF 
industry. The goal of the program is to develop blood-based genomic and proteomic tests 
to diagnose HF and distinguish between DHF and SHF. Development of a blood-based 
biomarker would allow general practitioners to diagnose HF in the primary care setting. 
This would allow earlier diagnosis and prevent patients from having to travel to tertiary 
care centres for diagnosis. PROOF may also develop additional prognostic biomarker 
tests to predict diastolic and systolic heart failure progression. 
The molecular tests for HF industry are new and remain in the embryonic stages 
of the industry life cycle. As discussed, regulatory processes guiding acceptance of new 
products remain unclear, and despite a large and growing market, there are no known 
products currently marketed for clinical use. Many firms and academic laboratories are 
working to discover and develop biomarkers for HF diagnosis; however, most of these 
efforts are at the early stages. Therefore, the industry as a whole has a low concentration 
ratio, and is unprofitable because of resource-intensive new product development.     
2.7.2 Competition is Low in this Industry 
Competition in the molecular tests for HF market is low overall.  The market is 
large and is anticipated to undergo strong growth as the population ages and as more 
patients survive earlier cardiac events/CVD.  There is room in such a large market for 
many different players to occupy profitable positions, particularly where differentiated 
products are developed.  Moreover, with many different firms and institutions operating 
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in the industry, and no commercialized products in this area, no single firm holds 
significant market power.  Finally, as has been discussed elsewhere, rivals in this industry 
face high switching high switching costs—for regulators, payers, laboratories, physicians, 
and patients.  These switching costs tend to decrease rivalry because customers cannot 
easily switch technologies once they have adopted a particular test.   
Although overall rivalry is low in this market, in the absence of any currently 
marketed multiplexed tests there is a rush to be the first to market, and several 
competitors deserve further mention. The Belgian firm Pronota has a proprietary platform 
for discovery of low-abundance plasma proteins which is it is leveraging for biomarker 
discovery and development for HF (Pronota NV, 2010). Furthermore, several large 
diagnostics and pharmaceutical companies have an established presence in the HF market 
in general, and physicians already use single biomarkers (e.g. NT-proBNP) for risk 
stratification of heart disease and HF patients in some places. Abbott Laboratories, for 
example, has developed a point-of-care platform for measuring blood biomarkers, and 
through a partnership with BG Medicine is developing galectin-3 as a potential biomarker 
for acute HF (Abbott Laboratories, 2009). While such firms may be lagging in the 
development of multiplexed panels of HF biomarkers, their availability of financial, 
regulatory, and marketing resources may allow them to expand their offerings in the HF 
space very rapidly and may thus represent formidable rivals.   
2.7.3 There is a Moderate Threat of Substitution 
Substitutes for molecular tests for HF diagnosis present a moderate threat.  Other 
modes of clinical assessment, including echocardiography and MRI are used, but are 
costly, can be invasive, and are generally unavailable in primary care settings.  However, 
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if cheaper and less technologically complex version of these types of assessment tools are 
developed and adopted, these could present a significant threat to biomarker-based tests 
such as those PROOF is developing. 
New drugs, cell/gene therapies, and/or devices (e.g. circulatory support systems 
and implantable defibrillators) that treat both SHF and DHF equally well would present a 
second substitute for molecular tests distinguishing SHF from DHF.  However, the pace 
of drug discovery for HF has slowed in recent years, owing to several high-profile HF 
trial failures and to the astronomical cost of conducting large-scale HF trials ($100-$200 
million) (Kaye & Krum, 2007).  Although cell/gene therapy could conceivably cure HF 
and obviate the need for HF diagnostics, these treatments face many development and 
regulatory hurdles before they are widely adopted into clinical practice. Heart transplants 
may be helpful for end stage HF patients, but cannot be widely implemented because of 
lack of donor hearts and the cost of managing transplant patients.  Finally, because of the 
lack of available treatments for DHF, molecular tests for distinguishing SHF from DHF 
may compete with the notion that no diagnosis is acceptable.   
2.7.4 Buyers Hold a Moderate Degree of Power over Industry Participants 
Firms operating in the molecular tests for HF industry face moderate buyer power 
for many of the reasons discussed previously. Payers, physicians, and hospitals/ 
laboratories are the primary consumers, and hold considerable power over test 
developers. However, though payers are price sensitive and concentrated, they are 
motivated to reduce unnecessary expenditures associated with treating DHF patients with 
ineffective SHF drugs. Payers thus would rationally be open to reimbursing a diagnostic 
that distinguished DHF from SHF.  
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2.7.5 Suppliers of Platform Technologies are Powerful 
Participants in the molecular tests for HF industry face platform developers that 
are forward integrating, hoping to capture more value from the market by marketing not 
only their technology platforms, but also tests utilizing their platforms. In addition, once 
firms have selected a technology platform supplier and have begun the development and 
regulatory processes necessary to bring their new tests to market, it is costly and time-
consuming to switch platforms. Thus, technology platform developers hold a high degree 
of power as suppliers to the firms developing molecular tests for HF management.   
2.7.6 The Threat of New Entrants is Low 
The threat of new entrants in the industry in biomarkers for HF is low, as has been 
reviewed for other industries.  New entrants face high patent barriers, require access to 
patients/samples, and face large capital requirements, long time horizons, and significant 
regulatory uncertainty.  Despite these barriers to entry, the large and growing market size 
is an enticing incentive, and because of the burden of HF on individuals and on health 
care budgets, governments and funding agencies are actively encouraging new biomarker 
discovery and platform technology development in this area.   
2.7.7 Government Regulators are Very Influential 
New molecular tests are highly regulated, and these regulations are widely 
expected to become more burdensome. Thus, governments hold a high degree of 
influence over firms operating in the molecular tests for HF industry. 
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2.7.8 Summary of External Analysis for Biomarkers of Chronic Heart Failure 
 The external environment for the industry in new molecular tests for HF 
management is summarized in Figure 2-8 and generally renders the industry an 
unattractive one for potential investors. Despite strong and growing market potential, 
development efforts are costly and time-consuming, and payers, physicians, and platform 
technology suppliers hold considerable power. Nevertheless, because of the large 
socioeconomic burden presented by HF, firms believing their molecular tests to be more 
efficacious than alternatives, protected from infringement by competitors, and cost-
effective from a health economics standpoint may still perceive this to be a very attractive 
industry. 
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• Large, rapidly growing market  (-)
• Low concentration ratio low (+)
• High switching costs once physicians have adopted test (-)
Industry Competition:  Low
• High degree of patenting (-)
• Patients/samples are essential complementary assets (-)
• Capital/time-intensive (-)
• Regulatory uncertainty (-)
• Economies of learning (-)
Threat of New Entrants:  Low
• Payers are concentrated and highly price-sensitive (++)
• Buyers want to reduce unnecessary treatment of DHF patients with 
SHF drugs (-)
• Strong patient advocacy vs. doctors and payers (-)
• Doctors are conservative (+)
• High motivation for better alternatives (-)
Bargaining Power of Buyers: Moderate
• Other modes of clinical assessment used but are expensive and 
unavailable in smaller centres eg. echo, MRI (+/-)
• No biomarkers currently in the clinic (-)
• New drugs that prevent disease progression to full-blown heart failure 
(+)
• Transplants (+/available but not widely applicable(+/-)
• No diagnosis perceived to be an option because of lack of treatments 
available for DHF (+)
Threat of Substitutes:  Moderate
• Regulatory authority (+)
• Threat of changing regulatory requirement (+)
Influence of Government:  High
• High platform switching costs (+)
• Suppliers are forward integrating (+)
Bargaining Power of Suppliers:  High
 
Figure 2-8:  Summary of Competitive Forces Impacting the Biomarkers of 
Chronic Heart Failure Industry 
Source:  by author 
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2.8 Biomarker-Based Diagnosis of Early Cardiovascular Disease 
2.8.1 Overview of PROOF’s Biomarker-Based Diagnosis of Early Cardiovascular 
Disease Program 
Cardiovascular disease (CVD) is the leading cause of death and serious illness in 
North America, where 1 in 3 people have some form of the disease. The full economic 
cost of CVD in the US in 2009, including health care services, medications, and lost 
productivity was nearly $500 billion (American Heart Association, 2010). Many scholars 
have argued that earlier CVD diagnosis would permit earlier intervention and decrease 
downstream healthcare costs. Biomarkers (e.g. troponins and NT-proBNP) exist to 
diagnose CVD after an acute cardiac event such as a heart attack. However, while 
scientists have identified many proteins that might have potential as markers of early 
CVD, none of these markers have sufficient individual power to diagnose the very early 
stages or risk of developing CVD.   
PROOF’s program in biomarker-based diagnosis of early CVD operates in the 
industry focusing on CVD diagnostics.  PROOF aims to use a quantitative, highly 
sensitive proteomics technique called multiple reaction monitoring mass spectrometry 
(MRM-MS) to develop an assay for determining the blood concentration of 95 published 
potential protein biomarkers for CVD.  The goal is to commercialize the assay for early 
CVD detection. A second goal is to leverage the evidence and experience gained through 
this process to serve as proof-of-principle for using MRM-MS technology as a platform 
technology to develop assays for other disease indications. 
There is a growing market for molecular tests for CVD diagnosis, and for new 
assay technologies that are amenable to clinical implementation. The molecular 
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diagnostics for CVD industry is new and has attracted significant funding and industrial 
and public attention. However, the industry has a low concentration ratio and remains 
unprofitable because most firms have few or no commercialized products.     
2.8.2 Competition Presents a Low to Moderate Threat 
Firms operating in the molecular tests for early CVD diagnosis industry face low 
to moderate competition.  The market is large and growing, leaving room for multiple 
firms with different products to identify a profitable niche. There is also very large 
demand for new, clinically relevant assay technologies as researchers, clinicians, and 
regulators seek to apply genomic and proteomic knowledge gains to improving human 
health.  Again, this growing market tends to decrease competition as different buyer 
segments can be targeted by different firms.  Firms operating in this industry face high 
switching costs once buyers have adopted a molecular test and platform technology.  
These costs tend to decrease inter-firm rivalry.  However, it is worth noting that many 
organizations are developing biomarkers to serve this industry, and tests for some single 
biomarkers (e.g. troponins) are already being marketed.  The low concentration and 
potential “head start” that these firms have tend to increase competition from an 
otherwise low level.   
2.8.3 Many Potential Substitutes Exist 
New molecular tests for early CVD diagnosis face a high threat of substitution.  
Rigorous clinical assessment, including familial history, lipid profiling and diet/lifestyle 
assessment, is common and cost-effective, though it relies heavily on potentially 
inaccurate self-reporting.  Angioplasty and coronary artery bypass grafting (CABG) are 
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commonly used to decrease risk of (further) cardiovascular events (Lloyd-Jones et al., 
2010).  While surgical interventions remain costly and invasive, as these procedures 
become more common, less costly, and more widely available they may present a viable 
substitute for early diagnosis.  The development of new CVD drugs, cell/gene therapies, 
and/or devices that treat and reverse CVD could also reduce the demand for early CVD 
diagnostics.  Finally, CVD prevention programs are increasingly being implemented, and 
present perhaps the biggest threat of substitution for new molecular tests for early 
diagnosis.  Indeed, it has been argued that the most cost-effective strategy would be to 
shift public policy towards an intensive, broadly implemented CVD prevention strategy 
(Kraushaar & Kramer, 2009).   
2.8.4 Buyers Hold Considerable Power 
The ultimate buyers of technologies and assays facilitating early diagnosis of 
CVD include payers, hospital/central laboratories, and physicians which collectively hold 
considerable power over test developers, as has been discussed.    
2.8.5 Suppliers are Powerful and Forward-Integrating 
Participants in the molecular tests for CVD diagnosis industry face platform 
developers that are forward integrating. Suppliers of the technology for MRM-MS, which 
has historically been a research tool rather than a clinical one, are developing newer-
generation technologies that may be appropriate for the clinical market. There is strong 
incentive for these firms to expand their customer base by entering the clinical markets. 
In addition, once firms have selected a technology platform supplier and have begun the 
development and regulatory processes necessary to bring their new tests to market, it is 
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costly and time-consuming to switch platforms. Thus, technology platform suppliers hold 
a high degree of power as suppliers to the firms developing molecular tests for early 
CVD diagnosis.   
2.8.6 There is a Relatively Low Threat of New Entrants 
As in other industries discussed, the threat of new entrants in the industry in tests 
for CVD diagnosis is low.  New entrants face high patent barriers, require access to 
patients/samples, and face large capital requirements, long time horizons, and significant 
regulatory uncertainty.  However, the large and growing market size is an enticing 
incentive, and new firms are entering the industry despite these barriers to entry.    
2.8.7 Government Regulators are Highly Influential 
New molecular tests are highly regulated, and these regulations are widely 
expected to become more burdensome. Thus, governments hold a high degree of 
influence over firms operating in the molecular tests for CVD diagnosis industry. 
2.8.8 Summary of External Analysis for Biomarker-Based Diagnosis of Early 
Cardiovascular Disease 
The external influences impacting the industry in assays and technologies for 
early CVD detection is summarized in Figure 2-9. Although the industry is new, has 
strong growth potential, and is somewhat protected from new entrants, it also is costly 
and time-intensive, with buyers and suppliers both holding significant power.     
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• Large and growing CVD market (-)
• Large and growing market for new assay technologies  (-)
• High switching costs once physicians have adopted test (-)
• Many labs and firms developing biomarkers (though more focus on 
post-event biomarkers e.g. troponin, NT-BNP); low concentration ratio 
(+)
Industry Competition:  Low to Moderate
• High degree of patenting (-)
• Patients/samples are essential complementary assets (-)
• Capital/time-intensive (-)
• Regulatory uncertainty (-)
• Economies of learning (-)
Threat of New Entrants:  Low
• Payers are concentrated and highly price-sensitive (++)
• Physicians are risk-averse (+)
Bargaining Power of Buyers: High
• Rigorous clinical assessment (e.g. familial risk, lipid profiling) is 
commonly used (+)
• Angioplasty, CABG are common, decreasing in price, and more widely 
available (+)
• New drugs being developed for better treatment of CVD (+)
• CVD prevention programs are increasingly being implemented (+)
Threat of Substitutes:  High
• Regulatory authority (+)
• Threat of changing regulatory requirement (+)
Influence of Government:  High
• High platform switching costs (+)
• Suppliers (MRM-MS equipment) are forward integrating? (+)
• High supplier concentration (+)
Bargaining Power of Suppliers:  High
2.9 Summary—The Industries in which PROOF Operates 
This section utilized standard analytical tools for assessing the key external forces 
impacting an industry. From this analysis, we can draw several broad conclusions about 
the attractiveness of the industries in which PROOF operates. Firstly, all of the industries 
analyzed face a high degree of government and supplier influence, and this pressure is 
Figure 2-9:  Summary of Competitive Forces Impacting the Biomarker-Based 
Diagnosis of Early Cardiovascular Disease Sector 
Source:  by author 
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likely to remain stable or intensify in the future. Perhaps the least attractive industry 
assessed is the industry in molecular tests for organ transplant patient management. This 
is because of the combination of small market potential, high inter-firm rivalry, and high 
threat of substitution. PROOF’s programs in biomarkers for COPD, HF, and CKD 
operate in arguably more attractive industry environments. Buyer power in the market for 
drug development biomarkers and molecular tests for COPD is low compared to the other 
industries assessed, since pharmaceutical firms are desperate for this commodity and 
there are few substitutes. In the industry for new molecular tests for HF, physicians and 
payers have a strong desire to reduce unnecessary and potentially harmful treatment of 
DHF patients with SHF drugs, and have few substitutes. In the industry for new 
molecular tests for CKD, payers and doctors wish to reduce unnecessary treatment of 
stable patients, and increase monitoring and therapy for patients with rapidly progressing 
disease. Thus in all three industries buyer power is reduced to a moderate level.  
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3:  PROOF’S INTERNAL SITUATION:  ADEPT AND 
AGILE, BUT VULNERABLE 
 The performance of a not-for-profit such as PROOF arises from the combination 
of the organization’s external environment, its internal resources and capabilities, and the 
strategic choices it makes in response to both. Chapter 2 reviewed the structure and 
features of the industries in which PROOF’s programs operate. Chapter 3 will assess the 
organization’s internal activities within the context of value creation process for new 
molecular tests. PROOF’s key resources and capabilities will be summarized, and 
subsequently analyzed in the context of the value creation process for new molecular 
tests. This final step of the internal analysis will demonstrate where PROOF’s strengths 
and weaknesses lie in the value creation process.   
3.1 PROOF’s Resources and Capabilities 
 Internal resources and capabilities, if developed and deployed effectively, can 
help organizations define a unique and competitive strategic position. PROOF possesses 
several different types of resources, capabilities, and assets:  financial (cash, capital, 
borrowing potential); physical assets (equipment); human resources (labour, managerial 
skills, loyalty); intangible assets (reputation, brand, values, culture); and technological 
assets (patents). The key strengths and weaknesses in PROOF’s arsenal of resources and 
capabilities are outlined below. 
3.1.1 Financial 
 PROOF has been exceptionally successfully at building and leveraging 
relationships in order to attract investment. This has led to more than ten million dollars 
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in cash and in-kind investments from non-NCE partners, including academic, industrial, 
and government interests. Table 3.1 summarizes PROOF’s financial resources.   
Table 3-1:  Cash and In-Kind Resources Committed to PROOF as of June 2010 
 Cash ($) In-Kind ($) Total ($) 
NCE CECR Program 15.0 million  15.0 million 
Other Partners 4.4 million 6.4 million 10.7 million 
TOTAL FUNDING 19.3 million 6.4 million 25.7 million 
Source:  by author, adapted from PROOF Centre Annual Report 2009-2010 
 Figure 3-1 shows PROOF’s actual (year 1 and 2) and projected (years 3-5) cash 
expenditures.   
Figure 3-1:  PROOF’s Actual/Projected Cash Spending and Projected Cash 
Reserves—Excludes cash gains from investment interest and potential revenues from 
licensing, product sales, and contract services.  
 
Source:  by author, adapted from PROOF Centre Annual Report 2009-2010 
 
The projected cash reserve shown above assumes that PROOF fails to attract any 
additional cash investments, licensing revenues, product sales, or contract services 
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revenues. Even in this worst-case scenario, PROOF has more than sufficient resources to 
carry out its planned biomarker research and development activities, and should have 
flexibility to expand its programs if it can access additional investment or increase 
revenue generation.    
It is worth noting that of projected cash expenditures, more than 75% ($11.6 
million of $15.4 million total projected spending) is committed to biomarker programs 
(i.e. to research and development). This is exceptionally high; in comparison, between 
1996 and 2005, ten of the largest global pharmaceutical companies spent $288 billion on 
R&D, or 16.3% of $1.77 trillion total spending (Lauzon L-P & Hasbani M, 2006). 
Genomic Health Inc., the early stage molecular diagnostics firm that markets Oncotype 
Dx, directed 30.4% of total spending to R&D in 2009, the first year it became cash-flow 
positive (Genomic Health Inc., 2009). PROOF has therefore been highly successful at 
directing most of its cash to directly productive spending. In part, this is the result of 
successfully attracting in-kind investment to pay for support functions (e.g. 
administrative staff, intellectual property management, and IT support).   
Ironically, though it has excelled at fiscal management, perhaps PROOF’s 
greatest long-term threat is also financial. PROOF’s long-term financial security is 
unclear since its 5-year funding window from the NCE will end in 2013, and it remains 
unclear whether the NCE will hold a renewal funding competition. Although this is a 
reality of the external environment, PROOF’s limited funding timeline seriously hinders 
PROOF’s internal ability for long-term planning, and represents the single greatest 
weakness of the organization.    
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3.1.2 Physical 
PROOF has few physical resources, and instead operates largely by leveraging 
physical assets held by collaborators and partners. The organization is housed within St. 
Paul’s Hospital via in-kind support. This could be viewed as a strength or a weakness. On 
one hand, it means that PROOF holds few capital assets that could be liquidated should 
the need arise; on the other hand, the organization has not had to sink precious financial 
resources into physical assets that depreciate over time.     
3.1.3 Human Resources 
PROOF is fortunate to have a richly experienced and deeply committed team. The 
organization’s management team includes clinical, laboratory medicine, business 
development, computational, and assay development expertise. The organization’s Board 
of Directors and Translational Advisory Committee provide broad pharmaceutical, 
government, diagnostics, financial, and academic expertise. PROOF maintains a 
relatively small workforce and a flat organizational structure, which allows it to be 
nimble in introducing change and adjusting course. Its workforce is highly educated, 
loyal, and committed to helping PROOF bring new molecular tests to the patients that 
need them. PROOF is rich in individuals that possess T-shaped skills—that is, deep 
knowledge in a particular discipline paired with an understanding of how that discipline 
interfaces with a variety or related disciplines (Leonard-Barton, 1995).         
However, PROOF may face several human resources-related weaknesses. While 
the small number of employees keeps payroll costs low, PROOF may be at risk of having 
insufficiently powered support for critical activities, particularly computation, program 
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management, regulatory affairs, and intellectual property management. This could create 
processing bottlenecks that delay biomarker development programs. In addition, PROOF 
relies on in-kind support from UBC for some contract management, intellectual property, 
and business development services. While this preserves cash resources, it may leave the 
organization at risk of hold-ups for these activities. Indeed, exceptionally lengthy contract 
negotiations have been a significant bottleneck for PROOF in the past two years. Finally, 
few PROOF personnel have direct experience in regulatory affairs, business 
development, and commercialization functions. The workforce has been eager to learn 
these skills and thus far has adopted a “learn-by-doing” approach with the support of key 
Board, TAC personnel and external consultants. However, as PROOF’s biomarker 
programs mature and move closer to commercialization and implementation, this 
approach may be insufficient, and the organization may need to hire in additional 
experienced personnel to support these critical areas.   
3.1.4 Intangible Assets 
PROOF’s greatest assets arguably fall into this category. The organization’s 
management team have leveraged deep clinical, academic, and industrial connections for 
the organization’s benefit. PROOF has built extensive reputational capital with 
physicians by building its biomarker research programs to address what clinicians report 
to be their greatest needs in patient care. Physicians and the public value the 
organization’s status as a not-for-profit because it signals lack of corporate bias and 
recognition of the social issues arising from new molecular test development. Industry, 
on the other hand, values PROOF’s deep connections with physicians. In this way, 
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PROOF has been able to build a very valuable brand as an entity that facilitates essential 
relationships between different sectors. This is one of the organization’s greatest assets. 
3.1.5 Technological Assets 
PROOF has significant technological assets in the form of patents and 
computational know-how. The firm holds patents related to biomarker panels for use in 
the diagnosis and prognosis of multiple disease states, and is taking an active approach to 
filing further disclosures. The organization has developed capabilities in computational 
strategies for biomarker discovery and validation, and in data management and 
processing.     
3.1.6 Summary of PROOF’s Resources, Capabilities, and Assets 
The above review of PROOF’s internal environment reveals both reasons for 
optimism and areas that require attention from the organization’s management. The 
biggest threat facing the organization is its limited ability for long-term financial and 
strategic planning owing to the 5-year timelines imposed by the NCE. The firm may 
require additional commercial expertise to support commercialization activities necessary 
to bring its products to market. However, PROOF benefits from a strong reputation as an 
organization that brings multiple sectors together in a collaborative fashion, and has core 
computational strengths.    
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3.2 PROOF’s Position in the Value Creation Process for New 
Molecular Tests 
Section 3.1 identified the key resources and capabilities held by PROOF. This 
section will assess the value creation process for new molecular tests. While this type of 
value chain analysis is most clearly applicable to firms that utilize a physical flow of 
activities to convert inputs to outputs, it is also useful in technology-based organizations 
such as PROOF to disaggregate the way in which a firm generates products or executes 
services (Porter, 1985). This analysis will identify and explain the activities that PROOF 
performs alone and via contracts/partnerships. Finally, PROOF’s strengths and 
weaknesses will be mapped onto the value creation process for new molecular tests. This 
process will help identify where PROOF’s potential competitive advantage lies in the 
context of the value creation process (Duncan, Ginter, & Swayne, 1998).         
 Figure 3-2 shows the value chain for an organization developing new molecular 
tests. Because PROOF is not in a manufacturing-based business, the prototypical value 
chain (Porter, 1985) has been adapted to reflect the set of value-adding activities required 
to bring new biomarker-based molecular tests to market. In this way, the primary 
activities shown represent incremental stages of increasing product value. The primary 
and support activities necessary for developing new molecular tests are outlined in the 
following sub-sections.   
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Figure 3-2:  Value Creation Process for Firms Creating New Molecular Tests 
 
Source: by author, adapted from Porter, 1985   
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3.2.1 Primary Activities in Creation of New Molecular Tests  
PROOF is primarily in the business of generating and processing new biomarker-
related intellectual property. This includes panels of discriminative biomarkers and 
algorithms for the generation and application of these panels. In the adapted value chain 
shown above, five distinct sets of primary activities create value, while research and 
development is underlying all primary activities. At each stage of development, an 
organization such as PROOF has the option either to complete the subsequent stage in-
house, or to out-source (some of) the activities associated with the subsequent stage by 
direct sale, out-licensing, or contracting activities to a partner. This decision will depend 
on internal resources and capabilities, availability of contract research organizations 
specializing in the activities in question, and the market for in-licensing deals at that 
particular stage. 
3.2.1.1 Biomarker Discovery 
In the biomarker discovery stage, potential biomarkers are identified from a small 
population of patients. This stage includes five different sets of activities. PROOF 
performs some of these activities internally and others through partnerships. Recruitment, 
phenotyping, sample collection, and sample banking typically occur at a single clinical 
site. For most programs, PROOF performs these activities itself.    
The next steps are sample processing and biomarker discovery. PROOF performs 
sample processing itself. For genomic biomarker discovery, this entails extraction of 
RNA from whole blood; for proteomic biomarker discovery, this involves depletion of 
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the 14 most abundant proteins from banked plasma samples. PROOF contracts out 
biomarker discovery activities to partner organizations because of the cost and expertise 
required to set up and run high-performance biomarker discovery platforms internally.     
The output of the biomarker discovery step is large, complex data files including 
tens of thousands of genes and proteins. Within these data sets, there are perhaps a 
handful of genes and proteins that are differentially expressed between the patient groups 
of interest. Identifying these genes and protein and combining them into a set of 
discriminative biomarker panels is the final and arguably the most value-adding step in 
biomarker discovery. This step requires deep expertise in statistics, data mining, 
bioinformatics, and combinatorial analysis. PROOF performs this activity in-house via its 
computational team. 
3.2.1.2 Biomarker Validation 
The output of biomarker discovery activities is a set of biomarker panels that each 
have the potential to distinguish amongst two or more types of patients. Once a set of 
biomarker panels is identified, PROOF must determine which panel is the most 
promising. This activity is called biomarker panel refinement. It involves testing different 
computational, statistical, and combinatorial methods to identify a robust discriminative 
biomarker panel. PROOF’s computational team performs this step internally.   
Once the biomarker panel has been refined, the next step is internal validation. 
The goal of internal validation is to test the performance of the biomarker panel in a 
different cohort of patients. This is primarily a computational activity involving rigorous 
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testing of the sensitivity, specificity, and diagnostic power of the test. PROOF typically 
performs this step via its computational team.     
3.2.1.3 Assay Development and Validation 
The goal of assay development and validation is to transfer the internally 
validated biomarker panel to an assay platform. This is necessary because biomarker 
discovery platforms generally are not amenable to quantitative biomarker measurement. 
The first activity involved is developing a laboratory method for assaying the internally 
validated panel of biomarkers. Biomarker developers must then test the assay’s 
performance in a prospective cohort of patients enrolled at multiple sites. PROOF is 
carrying out this process in collaboration with several industry partners.   
The second step is external qualification. During this process, the firm tests the 
discriminative power of the biomarker panel in a larger, more diverse patient population. 
As in biomarker discovery, this requires patient recruitment, sample banking, and sample 
processing. However, external qualification requires hundreds of patients at multiple 
clinical sites, ideally internationally. PROOF has established relationships with enrolling 
sites through its professional networks to support this activity. For example, for the 
validation phase of PROOF’s BiT program, patients are being recruited at thirteen 
Canadian and two international sites. PROOF contracts these sites to enrol, phenotype, 
collect, and bank samples from patients according to standard operating procedures that 
PROOF sets.   
The third step is analytical assay validation, which tests the reproducibility and 
variability of the method used to measure biomarkers. PROOF has not reached this step 
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in the value chain for any of its programs. The organization plans to carry this activity out 
in collaboration with a partner having more experience in assay validation.     
3.2.1.4 Molecular Test Development and Analytical Validation 
The output from the previous phase of development is an externally validated 
assay that individual clinical laboratories could deploy as a laboratory-developed test 
(LDT). Currently, clinical labs can perform LDTs without requiring FDA approval. The 
fourth primary activity in the value creation process for new molecular test development 
involves converting an LDT into an FDA-approved molecular test. This involves 
transitioning the assay from a validation platform to a FDA-approved clinical platform, 
and re-validating the test on this platform. Again, PROOF has not reached this activity 
for any of its programs. The organization plans to pursue these activities within a 
strategic partnership, or to out-license prior to this stage.  
3.2.1.5 Manufacturing and Commercialization 
Manufacturing and commercialization is the end game of development of new 
molecular tests. PROOF does not have expertise in manufacturing, distribution, sales, 
marketing, or obtaining market approval and reimbursement. Therefore, it is seeking to 
out-license its products prior to this stage, or at least to heavily engage strategic partners 
to perform these functions. To build these capabilities internally would require many 
years and significant resources, neither of which the NCE’s timelines permit. Therefore, 
these steps are given minimal attention here.    
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3.2.2 Support Activities in New Molecular Test Development 
Support activities do not directly create value but enable primary activities 
(Porter, 1985). A brief overview illustrates how each activity supports PROOF’s primary 
activities discussed above. 
3.2.2.1 Technology Development 
Technology development functions support new molecular test development in 
three key areas:  platform development, new assay development, and computational 
method development. Development of new technology platforms enables measurement of 
biomarker panels using clinically applicable platforms. This has thus far not been a major 
focus for PROOF, although it is at the early stages of developing MRM-MS technology 
for multiplex protein measurement in the clinical setting. New assay development is 
underway, heavily supported by industrial partners for the BiT program. Computational 
method development is a key internal strength for the organization, as has been 
discussed.    
3.2.2.2 Procurement 
Procurement refers to the ability of the organization to obtain the inputs critical to 
the value creation process. This includes patient samples, financial resources, platform 
technologies, and general relationship management. Patient samples are the critical input 
for high-quality biomarker discovery efforts. PROOF has been very successful at gaining 
access to patient cohorts by leveraging its clinical and industrial networks. As has been 
discussed, PROOF has also been highly successful at attracting financial and in-kind 
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inputs beyond the initial NCE investment. It has accessed the platform technologies 
necessary to enable biomarker discovery, qualification, and commercialization through 
partnerships with other non-profit organizations and for-profit firms. PROOF has 
accomplished this through highly successful management of relationships.     
3.2.2.3 Firm Infrastructure 
PROOF’s general management, financial management, intellectual property 
management, and business development capability underlie all of the organization’s 
primary activities. General management encompasses many activities and includes 
quality control and regulatory affairs supporting early interactions with regulatory 
authorities. In most cases, PROOF has built general management capabilities on an as-
needed basis. Overall, this has been successful approach. Financial management refers to 
the ability of the firm to obtain, manage, and sustain the resources necessary for new 
molecular test development. This will become increasingly important for PROOF as its 
programs mature into the costly assay and molecular test development and validation 
stages. Intellectual property management is an essential activity that can directly affect 
value in the later primary activities. If potential partners perceive the intellectual property 
around biomarker panels to be insufficient, the value of potential out-licensing deals 
decreases dramatically. Finally, PROOF needs access to key industry inputs to support all 
five primary activities, and therefore, business development activities are essential for 
PROOF’s success. For example, the organization may need validated antibodies for assay 
and molecular test development. PROOF will have to develop relationships with potential 
industry partners to fulfil this need.  Furthermore, business development activities are 
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essential for attracting potential out-licensing deals with pharmaceutical, biotechnology, 
and/or diagnostic firms.   
3.2.2.4 Human Resources Management 
Human resources management includes all activities related to recruitment, 
development, and retention of the organizational workforce.  This function is essential for 
the effective deployment of human resources to support PROOF’s primary activities.   
3.3 Where is PROOF’s Competitive Advantage? 
Preceding sub-sections identified the strengths and weaknesses in PROOF’s 
arsenal of resources and capabilities, and explained the primary and support activities in 
the value chain for new molecular test creation.  In order to identify PROOF’s 
competitive advantage, it is useful to map the organization’s critical strengths and 
weaknesses onto a value chain indentifying the activities that PROOF does and does not 
perform itself (Duncan et al., 1998).  Figure 3-3 summarizes this information using the 
value creation process outlined above in Figure 3-2.  The activities that PROOF performs 
itself are shown in blue.  The activities that PROOF performs (or intends to perform) in 
partnership or via contracting out are shown in mixed yellow/blue.  Activities that are 
outsourced entirely are shown in yellow.   Organizational strengths and weaknesses are 
depicted in green and red, respectively, and have been mapped to the primary and/or 
support activities that they impact most directly. 
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Figure 3-3:  PROOF’s Strengths and Weaknesses in the Value Creation Process for New Molecular Tests
 
Source:  by author, adapted from Porter, 1985 and Duncan, 1998
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Figure 3-3 reveals the focus of PROOF’s activities within the value chain for new 
molecular tests.  It also clarifies the positioning of PROOF’s strengths and weaknesses 
within the value chain.  Subsequent sections will elaborate on these issues separately.   
3.3.1 PROOF’s Position in the Value Creation Process for New Molecular Tests 
One can summarize PROOF’s business model as follows.  First, PROOF aims to 
offer best-in-class organ failure-related biomarker discovery and development services.  
This is the organization’s unique value proposition.  PROOF’s goal is to own and 
develop intellectual property to the point that a pharmaceutical, biotechnology, or 
diagnostics firm is interested in in-licensing it.  Thus, as is evident from Figure 3-3, 
PROOF’s activities focus primarily on biomarker discovery, biomarker validation, and 
assay development and validation.  An alternative strategy would be for PROOF to form 
a for-profit arm and sell molecular tests itself, which would require development of end-
to-end capabilities across the entire spectrum of primary activities.   
PROOF’s model for revenue generation combines revenues from out-licensing 
deals (some combination of upfront payment, milestone payments, and/or royalties on 
sales of any commercialized products), contract services, and direct product sales should 
the organization opt to market its own products.  Along the pathway of primary activities 
from biomarker discovery to new product manufacturing and commercialization, the 
original knowledge inputs become progressively more valuable.  Therefore, the value 
PROOF could obtain from out-licensing is almost certainly greater the further developed 
the intellectual property is.    
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Figure 3-3 shows that PROOF’s internal focus is on biomarker discovery and 
validation, general R&D, and certain support activities.  This reflects the organization’s 
strategy of out-licensing programs prior to full commercialization.    
3.3.2 PROOF’s Critical Strengths and Weaknesses 
The essential step in internal analysis is assessment of the relative contribution of 
a firm’s strengths and weaknesses to competitive advantage based on their value, rarity, 
imitability, and sustainability (Duncan et al., 1998).  Figure 3-3 maps out PROOF’s key 
internal strengths and weaknesses in the context of the value creation process.  This 
section will analyze these in turn.   
First, PROOF has very successfully leveraged its relationships and its unique 
status as a university-affiliated non-profit to access in-kind resources.  This has allowed it 
to direct most of its financial resources towards productive R&D.  Secondly, a variety of 
academic, clinical, and industrial partners perceive PROOF as neutral because it is a non-
profit.  This perception, combined with PROOF’s skill in relationship management, has 
given PROOF strong reputational and relationship-building capital.  Third, the 
organization’s agile structure, arising from cross-disciplinary team members and close 
affiliations with external organizations, allows it to adapt to changing priorities and 
environments.  Finally, the organization has attracted and nurtured highly trained 
personnel holding deep domain-specific and cross-disciplinary knowledge in organ 
failure and in computational and data management strategies.  Each of these strengths 
provides value to PROOF’s clients, is rare amongst the organization’s competitors, is 
difficult to imitate, and can be sustained.   
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From the perspective of rarity, imitability, and sustainability, two critical 
weaknesses stand out for PROOF.  First, PROOF’s NCE-imposed 5-year timeline 
seriously undermines the firm’s ability to execute all of its other activities by limiting the 
organization’s continued ability to build sustainable strengths.  Few competing 
organizations face such limitations.  Secondly, PROOF intends to rely on partnerships to 
support late-stage primary activities.   PROOF likely lacks sufficient power and expertise 
to support maximally effective business development, regulatory affairs, and 
commercialization activities.  It is therefore heavily reliant on the ability to form strategic 
partnerships and/or out-licensing deals with commercial partners.  This is not surprising; 
indeed, few organizations hold end-to-end capabilities from biomarker discovery to 
molecular test manufacturing and commercialization.  PROOF’s timelines are likely too 
short to build these capabilities internally.  Nevertheless, reliance on external partners 
makes PROOF subject to the changing fortunes of other organizations and industries.  
There is a significant risk that the organization may not be able to access the necessary 
expertise or forge the critical partnerships necessary to bring its products to market.   
To summarize, PROOF is operating in rapidly changing, nascent industries.  The 
organization must remain cognizant of the impact these internal weaknesses may have on 
its ability to compete successfully in these industries.       
3.4 Summary:  How PROOF’s Internal Situation Drives Competitive 
Advantage 
This chapter assessed PROOF’s resources and capabilities and reviewed the 
different primary and support activities required to bring a new molecular test to market.  
Analysis of the value creation process for new molecular tests showed that PROOF’s 
  89 
activities mainly focus on biomarker discovery, biomarker qualification, and early assay 
development and validation.  Internal analysis identified several weaknesses of 
PROOF’s, namely the organization’s limited timelines and its related heavy reliance on 
partnerships.  Both of these weaknesses increase the firm’s vulnerability to competition 
in its chosen industries.  However, the analysis also identified several key strengths:  
outstanding reputational and relationship-building capital, deep domain-specific 
knowledge, structural agility, and financial resource management.  These strengths are at 
the heart of PROOF’s competitive advantage.  The remainder of the analysis will identify 
ways in which PROOF might nurture its strengths while managing its weaknesses in 
order to compete most effectively in its chosen industries.    
  90 
4:  PROOF’S CURRENT STRATEGY AND EXPECTED 
OUTCOMES  
This section will summarize PROOF’s current strategy and assess the likely 
outcomes of this strategy.  This part of the analysis will lay the framework for generation, 
evaluation and recommendation of strategic alternatives in the forthcoming chapter. 
Strategy can be considered at four distinct levels:  corporate, positioning, 
competitive, and functional strategy.  At the corporate level, PROOF is in the business of 
discovery and development of biomarkers of organ health and disease.  Positioning and 
competitive strategies summarize the customer segments that the organization targets, 
and how it competes in these segments.  These business-unit levels of strategy will be the 
focus of this section.  Functional strategy, which defines how various functional areas 
support higher-level strategy, will not receive significant attention here.        
4.1 PROOF’s Current Business Strategy:  Develop and Outlicense 
Highly Differentiated Biomarker IP 
PROOF is developing high performance biomarker panels for the end user. The 
organization’s goal is to add value to intellectual property to the point that an industry 
client decides to in-license it. Internal analysis (see Chapter 3) showed that PROOF is 
very development-oriented, with relatively less orientation towards production and 
marketing issues. The positioning and competitive stances outlined below therefore 
reflect the intended strategies at the commercialization stage of the value creation process 
and may change as PROOF’s biomarker programs mature. 
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4.1.1 PROOF has a Niche Positioning Strategy 
PROOF’s general positioning strategy for its products is niche-focused.  PROOF 
aims to differentiate its products from existing alternatives (where they exist) in niche 
segments of the market for diagnostics/prognostics for organ health and disease.  The 
organization’s programs are positioned to yield validated biomarkers for clinical care or 
industry use, as summarized in Table 4-1. 
Table 4-1:  Positioning Strategy for PROOF’s Major Programs 
Program Positioning Strategy 
Biomarkers in 
Transplantation 
Molecular tests for use in transplant centres, just before/after 
transplant 
Chronic Kidney 
Disease 
Molecular tests for nephrologists to predict disease outcomes 
in newly diagnosed CKD patients 
Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease 
a.  Molecular tests for pulmonary doctors to predict (severity 
of) COPD in new or at-risk patients 
b. Validated biomarkers used for internal drug company 
decision-making 
Chronic Heart Failure Molecular tests for family doctors to identify the subtype of 
CHF that a newly diagnosed patient 
Early Diagnosis of 
Cardiovascular 
Disease  
Molecular test for hospital-/lab-based diagnosis of CVD 
Source:  by author  
4.1.2 Competitive Strategy 
At this point, PROOF intends to take a mixed approach to competitive strategy, 
combining differentiation and cost leadership.  PROOF is pursuing this high degree of 
differentiation in its development programs though the following strategic choices:  
• Carrying out discovery work in well-phenotyped patient cohorts with very 
high sample collection and sample management standards 
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• Designing biomarker discovery programs on the basis of detailed feedback  
from clinical thought leaders about where in the continuum of clinical care 
there is a need for new molecular tests  
• Utilizing state-of-the-art computational and statistical methods for achieving 
the best possible biomarker panel performance 
• Engaging industrial, government, clinical, patient, payer, academic and 
regulatory groups to “kick the tires” and refine biomarker development 
programs accordingly 
Highly differentiated products tend to be more highly priced than alternatives.  
Indeed, most molecular tests that are marketed are priced at several thousand dollars, 
compared to traditional (less differentiated) diagnostics that cost less than $100 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009b).  However, PROOF management also has a strong 
desire to bring its molecular tests to the market at a reasonable cost.  It will be difficult to 
achieve both a high degree of differentiation (e.g. a highly complex biomarker based test 
for use in the clinic) and a low or moderate cost.  Trade-offs between these two goals will 
likely need to be made en route to commercialization.  If biomarker programs are out-
licensed to commercialization agents, PROOF will probably lose any influence over the 
ultimate cost of the products arising from its biomarker programs.        
To summarize, internal analysis (Chapter 3) showed that PROOF’s current focus 
is primarily on the earlier stages of the value creation process for new molecular 
diagnostics. The organization does not have the internal capabilities or resources to bring 
new molecular tests to market alone. PROOF is therefore pursuing joint development, 
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out-licensing or sale of intellectual property to industrial recipients as the intended route 
to production and commercialization of its products.   
4.2 Successful Out-licensing is Likely, But Will it Happen Soon 
Enough?   
All of PROOF’s programs are presently too immature for out-licensing. However, 
it is very likely that PROOF will be able to out-license at least one of its biomarker 
programs as they mature over the next 1-3 years. The market for molecular tests is 
predicted to grow at a 14% compound annual growth rate, reaching $5 billion by 2012 
(Aspinall & Hamermesh, 2007). Both pharmaceutical and diagnostics firms need access 
to biomarker content to support their activities and pipelines.   
PROOF has very successfully nurtured relationships with large pharmaceutical 
companies. Indeed, PROOF has existing collaborations and/or has held exploratory 
partnering conversations with four of the ten largest global pharmaceutical companies. A 
major diagnostics firm holds an option to out-license intellectual property on one of 
PROOF’s programs, and it is likely that PROOF’s business development activities will 
yield other such deals. Thus, there is reason for optimism about PROOF’s ability to 
attract potential licensors. 
Despite this optimism, PROOF’s biomarker programs still require significant 
maturation before they will attract external licensing interest. One corporate partner has 
indicated that clinical validation will be required in order for their firm to consider in-
licensing. In other words, PROOF will have to fund development of its biomarker 
programs at least to the stage of a multi-site national or international clinical trial as it has 
done for the BiT program. PROOF’s programs may not achieve the developmental 
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maturity necessary for out-licensing within the organization’s time horizon. Moreover, 
licensing deals for biomarker IP typically involve some combination of up-front 
payments, development milestones, and royalties on any sales (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2009a). Licensors may not receive revenues from development milestones and sales 
royalties for some time, if it all. It is thus unclear whether PROOF will be able to harvest 
revenues arising from out-licensed programs in time to fulfil its sustainability mandate.    
4.3 The Critical Issue:  PROOF’s 2013 Sustainability Horizon 
PROOF’s current strategy is to focus on developing biomarker intellectual 
property, and to out-license biomarker programs to a commercialization agent for 
production, marketing, reimbursement, and sales activities. This approach is likely to be 
successful for at least some of the organization’s biomarker programs. However, it 
remains unclear whether this plan will yield the financial returns necessary to achieve 
organizational sustainability within the 5-year timeline imposed by PROOF’s sponsor.   
The experience of the Canadian Genetic Diseases Network (CGDN), one of the 
first NCE-funded networks, reinforces the challenge facing PROOF. Despite its 
reputation as perhaps the most successful NCE network, it took the CGDN three funding 
terms—more than 10 years—to begin to achieve the commercialization goals that the 
NCE had set out in the first term (Atkinson-Grosjean, 2006). This reinforces the assertion 
that PROOF’s biggest issue will be achieving sustainability by 2013. The next chapter 
will propose and evaluate several alternatives for PROOF going forward.   
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5:  ANALYSIS OF PROOF’S STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES 
Chapter 5 identified PROOF’s critical challenge as meeting the NCE’s 
requirement for sustainability by 2013. This chapter will describe and evaluate the 
strategic alternatives available to PROOF. Alternatives will be assessed using multi-goal 
analysis since PROOF is a not-for-profit institution with mandates and values that go 
beyond loss minimization (Boardman, Shapiro, & Vining, 2004).  
5.1 PROOF’s Strategic Alternatives for Near-Term Sustainability 
Based on the external and internal analyses performed in previous chapters, 
PROOF has several alternatives: 
5.1.1 Alternative 1: Maintain status quo 
PROOF’s first alternative is to continue to seek out-licensing/joint development 
opportunities for biomarker programs. This would allow the organization to continue to 
focus on its internal strengths in early-stage, clinically driven biomarker R&D. This 
alternative would require PROOF to gain clinical validation for at least some of its 
biomarker programs through multi-site clinical trials. The organization would have to 
access additional resources—primarily in the form of non-dilutive grants and additional 
financial or in-kind donations—to fund this development. This should not present a major 
hurdle, given PROOF’s historical success at identifying and capturing resources. 
However, under this scenario the organization would almost certainly lose control over 
the intellectual property, and therefore the ultimate pricing strategy, for its products.   
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5.1.2 Alternative 2:  Spin out one or more programs into a biomarker R&D firm 
This alternative would require out-licensing one or more of its programs to a new 
spin-out company. Under this alternative, PROOF could maintain more of a relationship 
with the licensee and therefore potentially maintain more control over the ultimate fate of 
the IP arising from the out-licensed program(s). As with an out-licensing deal to an 
external entity, formation of a spin-out arm would yield revenues for PROOF. However, 
spin-out formation would depend on access to seed financing through angel investors, 
grant funding, and/or venture capital. It is difficult to assess the availability of funding for 
molecular test start-ups because deal terms are rarely disclosed in this industry 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009a). However, there are many examples of creative ways 
to finance diagnostics spin-outs. For example, Arctic Diagnostics Inc. 
(www.arcticdx.com), spun out from a university research project, has thus far utilized 3F 
funding and non-dilutive grants to fund operations. The firm has maintained low 
overhead costs by headquartering within a technology incubator facility in Toronto. Both 
of these strategies could also be adopted by a PROOF spin-out.  
5.1.3 Alternative 3:  Expand contract computational services offerings  
 A third alternative is for PROOF to offer contract computational and statistical 
services for biomarker development. PROOF has not conducted a thorough assessment of 
the market potential for contract services in biomarker data management and analysis. 
Presuming a stable or growing market for PROOF’s contract computational and 
statistical services, this alternative would increase cash inflows for PROOF in the near 
term. However, the true value of this option would depend on the transaction costs 
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associated with managing the relationships with contractors. The cost of engaging 
PROOF’s computational services in external projects could also be significant because it 
could delay development of PROOF’s internal programs.     
5.1.4 Alternative 4:  Spin out one or more programs and expand contract services 
  A fourth alternative would be to combine spinning out one or more of PROOF’s 
biomarker programs and expanding contract services. 
5.2 PROOF’s Goals 
PROOF’s goals reflect the combination of NCE mandates and the vision of the 
organization’s management team. The six key goals of PROOF are as follows. Goals are 
presented in neutral, non-directional language since alternatives may have either a 
positive or a negative impact on goals.   
(1) Impact on commercialization and clinical implementation of new molecular tests:  
Accelerating the commercialization and clinical implementation of new molecular tests is 
both an NCE mandate and a deeply held value of PROOF’s management team. The 
organization believes that it is developing biomarker panels that have the potential to 
revolutionize patient care. There is a strong desire to get these products into to the clinic, 
where they can help the patients that need them, as quickly as possible. 
(2) Impact on Canadian capacity for research, development and commercialization:  
The organization has a strong mandate to attract, retain and develop talent. The NCE 
requires a strong focus on facilitating the growth and success of Canadian companies.      
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(3) Impact on short-term revenue generation:  Because of PROOF’s 2013 funding 
horizon, a key consideration for the organization is how each alternative will impact 
short-term revenue generation.  
(4) Impact on ability to grow internal capabilities:  While PROOF has a funding 
horizon, management is cautiously optimistic that an additional funding cycle will be 
accessible through the NCE or another source. The organization therefore values 
alternatives that will help it development and strengthen capabilities within the value 
creation process for new molecular tests. These will position PROOF to apply these 
capabilities successfully to future projects.      
(5) Impact on international profile:  PROOF aims to be internationally recognized as a 
hub for ground-breaking, clinically applicable biomarker research and development 
activities. This aligns closely with the overall goals of the NCE CECR program. 
(6) Impact on pricing strategy:  PROOF management would ideally like to retain (some) 
influence over the market price of the molecular tests that arise from its products.      
5.3 Multi-Goal Evaluation of PROOF’s Strategic Alternatives 
The multi-goal evaluation matrix shown in Table 5-1 assesses the impact of each 
strategic alternative on the goals outlined above. In order to quantify the impact of each 
alternative, each of the goals is assigned a weight based on its relative importance to the 
organization (a percentage, summing to one hundred percent for all the goals). The 
impact of each goal on each proposed alternative is quantified using a weighted low to 
high impact scale (e.g. high =5, medium-high=4; medium=3; medium-low=2; low=1). 
The product of the weighted goals and the impact values is then quantified and summed 
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for each alternative. The resulting weighted scores for each alternative quantify the 
degree to which each alternative fulfils the organization’s goals.  
The multi-goal analysis matrix reveals that PROOF’s most favourable alternative 
is proceeding with plans to out-license its biomarker programs as they mature. This 
alternative had very positive impact on four of the six organizational goals considered. 
On the other hand, the alternative that would have the least impact on goal maximization 
is expanding contract services offerings, which had a strongly positive impact on only 
one goal.   
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Table 5-1:  Multi-Goal Analysis of PROOF’s Strategic Alternatives 
 Strategic Alternatives 
Maintain Status 
Quo 
Spin Out ≥1 
Program 
Expand Contract 
Services 
Spin Out ≥1 
Program & 
Expand Contract 
Services 
Goals Weight Impact Value Impact Value Impact Value Impact Value 
Accelerate 
commercialization and 
clinical 
implementation  
30% Medium-
High (4) 
1.2 Medium 
(3) 
0.9 Low (1) 0.3 Medium-
Low (2) 
0.6 
Develop Canadian 
capacity for research, 
development and 
commercialization 
20% Medium-
High (4) 
0.8 Medium 
(3) 
0.6 Medium 
(3) 
0.6 Medium 
(3) 
0.6 
Maximize short-term 
revenue generation 
20% Low (1) 0.2 Medium 
(3) 
0.6 High (5) 1.0 Medium-
High (4) 
0.8 
Develop internal 
capabilities to build 
long-term 
sustainability 
15% High  (5) 0.75 Low (1) 0.15 Medium 
(3) 
0.45 Medium-
Low (2) 
0.3 
Increase international 
profile for excellence 
in biomarker R&D 
10% High (5) 0.5 Medium 
(3) 
0.3 Medium-
Low (2) 
0.2 Medium-
Low (2) 
0.2 
Maintain influence 
over pricing strategy 
5% Low (1) 0.05 Medium 
(3) 
0.15 Low (1) 0.05 Medium 
(3) 
0.15 
TOTAL   3.5  2.7  2.6  2.65 
Source:  by author, adapted from framework outlined in Boardman, Shapiro, and Vining (2004). 
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5.4 Sensitivity of PROOF’s Multi-Goal Analysis to Different 
Scenarios 
The multi-goal analysis shown above assumed the most likely scenario—that is, 
that the future external environment for new molecular tests and biomarkers will be 
similar to the present one. This scenario assumes that the development costs, regulatory 
costs, and overall timelines required to bring new molecular tests to market will remain 
relatively static. It also assumes that the market for new molecular tests will continue to 
grow, and therefore, that there will continue to be demand for in-licensing deals from 
pharmaceutical and diagnostic companies. More specifically to PROOF, the most likely 
scenario is that the organization will continue to be able to access additional resources, 
through NCE or other vehicles.   
However, the analysis of PROOF’s alternatives is undoubtedly sensitive to 
significant changes in the external environment. In the worst case scenario, regulatory 
requirements would be more burdensome and the market for molecular tests and in-
licensing deals would contract, perhaps because of a high-profile failure of a market-
approved test. It would be very difficult under this scenario to continue to access 
additional funds, and the NCE would fail to extend the CECR program beyond 2013. 
Under this scenario, short-term revenue generation would be much more important while 
development of Canadian capacity and internal capabilities would be relatively less 
important. Thus, the multi-goal analysis outcomes would favour different alternatives. 
Under the best case scenario, regulatory approvals would become easier, driven 
by strong patient, payer, and government pressure for accelerating availability of new 
molecular tests. Seed capital and follow-on funding would be easy to access for small 
firms operating in the molecular tests space, and the NCE would grant PROOF additional 
  102 
funding and extend the organization’s mandate. Under this scenario, short-term revenue 
generation would be much less important than building internal capabilities and 
reputational capital in order to sustain long-term success. This scenario would also shift 
the relative attractiveness of the proposed alternatives in the multi-goal analysis above.    
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6:  SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROOF 
The external analysis, internal analysis, and multi-goal assessment of PROOF’s 
strategic alternatives demonstrate that PROOF’s best alternative at the current time is to 
maintain status quo. The organization should continue to seek out-licensing opportunities 
for its biomarker programs as they mature. Should PROOF choose to implement this 
strategy, it would build and capitalize on existing strengths in the early portions of the 
value creation process. Commercialization partners would retain control of production, 
marketing, and late-stage commercialization activities. Partnerships and out-licensing 
deals with industry would be a strong signal of the organization’s quality and reputation, 
and would increase the international profile of PROOF and the Canadian biomarker 
community. If these deals could be negotiated with Canadian companies, this would give 
strong evidence for PROOF’s capacity to build and support Canadian industry.   
There are two major risks associated with this approach. The first is that market 
demand for in-licensing deals and/or strategic partnerships could be weak when 
PROOF’s programs reach the stage of maturity appropriate for out-licensing. The second 
is that the NCE may fail to continue sponsoring PROOF beyond 2013, and/or that the 
organization may be unable to access the resources necessary to bring its programs to a 
marketable level of maturity.     
The lowest ranked strategic alternative is expanding contract computational 
services offerings. Implementing this alternative would increase short-term revenue 
generation. However, it would also impose costs:  diverting the focus of PROOF’s 
computational team away from PROOF’s own projects; and managing marketing, 
operations, and relationships with contractors to support these services. 
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PROOF should not consider the recommendation to maintain the status quo the 
organization’s only option. Nor does this recommendation suggest that the organization 
should continue to do exactly what it is doing now, without changes. The analysis 
suggests that at the current time, under the current conditions, the most likely alternative 
to succeed is to continue according to the strategic plan laid out by PROOF. However, 
the analysis also suggests that the weight of the proposed alternatives is sensitive to 
changes in the external environment. It will therefore be important for PROOF to 
continue actively scanning its external environment for relevant changes, and to adjust 
course accordingly.  
Finally, PROOF has an opportunity to influence a critical element in its external 
environment:  the NCE. It is essential for PROOF to develop a political strategy for 
demonstrating the value of its activities to the NCE. This may help the organization 
circumvent the looming funding horizon. A political strategy could mobilize the public, 
industry leaders, and/or other NCEs as partners. Ideally, the strategy would target not 
only the NCE, but also Industry Canada, from which the NCE’s funding flows. 
Successful political influence would help PROOF shift the most likely scenario to the 
best case scenario. Under such conditions, PROOF is much more likely to be able to 
achieve the impact on patient and social health and well-being that it desires. 
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